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ABSTRACT

The autonomous vehicle (AV) industry works very hard to create public
trust in both AV technology and its developers. Building trust is part of a
strategy to permit the industry itself to manage the testing and deployment
of AV technology without regulatory interference. This article explains how
industry actions to promote trust (both individually and collectively) have
created concerns rather than comfort with this emerging technology. The
article suggests how the industry might change its current approach to law
and regulation from an adversarial posture to a more cooperative one in
which a space is created for government regulation consistent with
technology development. This article proposes a way forward that involves
re-thinking the use of SAE J3016 as part of AV law and regulation, instead
taking a new direction based on distinguishing test platforms from
production vehicles.
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INTRODUCTION

The autonomous vehicle (AV) industry works very hard to create public
trust in both AV technology and its developers.1 Building trust is part of a
strategy to permit the industry itself to manage the testing and deployment
of self-driving vehicle technology without regulatory interference. The
industry hopes that a high level of public trust will reduce or eliminate
motivation for the federal government, states, and municipalities to enact
meaningful safety laws and regulations governing both testing and
deployment of AVs. The industry argues that increased regulation will
impede innovation and slow the development of valuable technology. 2
The AV industry supplements its appeals for trust by extolling a
plethora of public benefits that AV technology supposedly will bring to
society.3 The AV industry attempts to shape both legislation and public
opinion in various ways, including through Partners for Automated
Vehicle Education (PAVE), a 501(c)(3) organization whose stated mission is
to "educate" the public on the benefits of AV technology. 4
In this article, we examine the behavior of certain AV industry
participants in various concrete situations, considering whether actions by
these AV industry participants promote trust or, conversely, create

1. See, e.g., Aurora Innovation, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), 83 (Nov. 5, 2021),

https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1828108/000119312521321663/d230050
dsl.htm [hereinafter Aurora S-1] ("The opportunity to revolutionize transportation is
massive, but this opportunity depends on trust. Our technology needs to be trustworthy.
Our company needs to be trustworthy. And so our task is to build trust, one step at a
time."); see also Reinvent Tech. Partners Y, Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement

(Form S-4), 244 (Aug. 27, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1828108/000119312521259448/d184562
ds4a.htm [hereinafter Reinvent S-4] (filing for Aurora's predecessor).
2. See, e.g., BILL CANIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45985, ISSUES IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE

TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT 8 (2021) [hereinafter ISSUES IN AV TESTING] (observing that
"[p]roponents of autonomous vehicles note that lengthy revisions to current vehicle
safety regulations could impede innovation, as the rules could be obsolete by the time
they take effect."). We explain how regulation can be compatible with innovation despite
industry protestations to the contrary. See infra text accompanying notes 132-137.
3. We discuss these advertised benefits in detail. See infra Section III (discussing myths

about AVs).
4. About, PAVE, https://pavecampaign.org/about (last visited April 12, 2022).
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concerns. To evaluate whether a particular action promotes trust, we
consider both common sense intuitions as well as recommendations
contained in three publications with intended global applicability: the
recently published IEEE Standard Model Process for Addressing Ethical
Concerns during System Design;' Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI
and Policy and Investment Recommendations for Trustworthy AI.7 The
European Commission set up the Independent High-Level Expert Group
on Artificial Intelligence in June 2018 with the task of delivering these two
reports on Trustworthy Al. While these European Commission reports
primarily focus on development and use of Al in Europe, they intend a
global reach.8 These publications inform our analysis of actions and
practices to identify those that merit trust and those that do not. (These
publications are useful to inform policy and legislation even though none
of them are in a form suitable for incorporation by reference into a law or
regulation.)
Our analysis identifies certain trust destroying practices, suggesting
that the public should not accept either AV industry appeals for trust or
take at face value the proffered narrative of benefits. We illustrate our

5. IEEE SA, IEEE STANDARD MODEL PROCESS FOR ADDRESSING ETHICAL CONCERNS DURING

SYSTEM DESIGN (2021) [hereinafter IEEE 7000], https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/7000/6781/
(available via purchase or subscription, on file with the authors). The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (or "IEEE") Standards Association has an express
global reach with the stated mission of "Raising the World's Standards." See IEEE SA

STANDARDS ASSOCIATION, https://standards.ieee.org/ (last visited April 12, 2022).
6. High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence on Ethics Guidelinesfor Trustworthy Al

(Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.aepd.es/sites/default/files/2019-12/ai-ethics-guidelines.pdf
[hereinafter Trustworthy Al Guidelines].
7. High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence on Policy and Investment
Recommendations for Trustworthy Al (June 26, 2019),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/italy/resource/static/files/import/intelligenzaartificiale_
30_aprile/ai-hlegpolicy-and-investment-recommendations.pdf [hereinafter Trustworthy

Al Policy].
8. "Beyond Europe, the Guidelines also aim to foster research, reflection and discussion
on an ethical framework for Al systems at a global level." Trustworthy Al Guidelines,
supra note 6, at 3. The Trustworthy Al Policy, supra note 7, is more Eurocentric than the
Trustworthy Al Guidelines, though its section on law and regulation supplements the
Trustworthy Al Guidelines, which focus on ethical principles and robustness. The
discussion of legality is left for the Trustworthy Al Policy.
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by examining trust destroying practices of Tesla (who is not a
of PAVE), Aurora Innovation, Inc. (a member of PAVE who
went public in a de-SPAC transaction),9 and various narrative
commonly used by AV industry members to advance their

collective agenda. We continue by explaining how AV industry participants
might destroy trust via political lobbying efforts undertaken to prevent
municipalities from passing local safety laws and regulations by preemptive state legislation-and advise against it. AV industry participants
have an active pre-emption effort underway in Pennsylvania and other
states.
These failures at trust-building suggest that self-regulation by the AV
industry is not a viable option and that more regulation is needed by
federal, state, and local governments to promote safety. Despite our
concerns, the AV industry might earn trust by changing its approach to law,
regulation, and disclosure from an adversarial stance to a cooperative one,
starting by compliance with standards promulgated by the engineering
community itself-an action that, almost by definition, would not impede
innovation.
Of course, the trust destroying practices we identify are merely
illustrative. Nor is the industry's conduct the only threat to public
confidence in AV technology: high-profile events-for example, Tesla's
recent software rollouts and retractions of software for its Full Self-Driving
(FSD) features,1 0 the Uber accident in Arizona," and the numerous videos
circulating on the internet which show worrisome behavior by Tesla
owners using Auto Pilot and FSD features 1 2-can be equally corrosive to
the public trust. With any new technology, accidents will occur despite the
best efforts of industry and government to prevent them. The AV industry
ought to take meaningful and visible steps to advance safety when it has

9. See Aurora S-1, supra note 1.
10. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., infra note 34 (Tesla refers to its current FSD deployments as "beta test"
activities, however, that software is being used by non-employee drivers having no
special tester training on public roads, and traffic laws still apply to such purported
"testers").
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the power to do so. It is important for the success of the AV industry that it
adopt practices to build trust so that it can better thrive when adverse
events beyond industry control materialize, as is inevitable.
As background, governmental approaches to AV regulation vary
widely across the United States, with some jurisdictions (such as Arizona,
Florida, Nevada, and Texas)13 having enacted laws that give AV companies
wide latitude to test and deploy AVs, whereas other states (such as
California)14 and municipalities (such as New York City)" seek to promote
safety through law and regulation. Further, some states currently are
considering laws and regulations governing AV testing and deployment.1 6
The federal government has failed to enact any legislation, or promulgate
regulations, governing AVs. 17
This Article proceeds in five parts: Part I describes how Tesla fails to
comply with California laws and regulations governing testing and
deployment of AVs.18 Both the Trustworthy Al Guidelines and the

13. Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 88.

14. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (2017) [hereinafter CAL. CODE § 38750]; CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 13, §§ 227-228 (2008).
15. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK tit. 34, ch. 4, § 4-17 (2021).
16. These include the states of Kansas (Kan. Reg. Leg. Sess. 2022, S.B. 379),

Pennsylvania(Pa. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2021-2022, S. B. 965), and Washington (Wash.
Reg. Leg. Sess., H.B. 1731). We understand preliminary discussions are underway to
develop a joint effort at AV regulation among New England states. The approach taken
in any future laws and regulations might be either permissive or protective. In some
states, governors have issued executive orders relating to AVs. See generally Autonomous
Vehicles I Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-selfdriving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx.
17. See, e.g., ISSUES IN AV TESTING, supra note 2, at 1.

18. We introduced this idea in an essay for JURIST. See William H. Widen & Philip
Koopman, Do Tesla FSD Beta Releases Violate Public Road Testing Regulations?, JURIST

(Sept. 27, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/09/william-widenphilip-koopman-autonomous-vehicles/. There is a growing awareness that Tesla's FSD
beta releases may violate California law. See Bryant Walker Smith, California'sAV Testing
Rules Apply to Tesla's "FSD", ROBOTICS.EE (Jan. 10, 2022),
https://robotics.ee/2022/01/10/californias-av-testing-rules-apply-to-teslas-fsd/. Professor
Bryant Walker Smith expressed similar concerns over Uber's testing in California in 2016.
See Bryant Walker Smith, Uber vs. The Law, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y AT STAN. L.
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Trustworthy Al Policies identify compliance with law as one of three
foundational elements needed to build trustworthy AI. 19
Part II uses the SEC Registration Statement on Form S-120 for Aurora
Innovation, Inc.'s (Aurora) public offering as an example of how the AV
industry avoids committing to a specific safety performance standard prior
to the initial deployment of AVs at scale. 21 Failure to disclose a standard for
deployment violates principles of transparency and makes it impossible to
effectively implement IEEE 7000.22
Part III identifies a "dirty dozen" myths about the status of AV
technology, debunking key points used by the AV industry both to promote
AV technology and argue for a light regulatory touch. 23 The use of these
myths is inconsistent with concerns expressed in ethics standards that no
one deceive the public about Al technology. 24

SCH.: BLOG (Dec. 17, 2016, 7:47 am), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/12/uber-vslaw.
19. See supra note 6.
20. See Aurora S-1, supra note 1.
21. One of us previously suggested that this disclosure failure violates United States
securities laws. See William H. Widen, Autonomous Vehicles, Moral Hazards & the "AV

Problem" (Univ. of Mia. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 3902217, 2021, forthcoming 3
Notre Dame J. Emerging Tech. Spring 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3902217 (the focus in this article is
on the impact of Aurora's disclosure choices on trust, not securities law compliance).

22. See IEEE 7000, supra note 5. Compliance with IEEE 7000 is voluntary. IEEE members,
however, agree to comply with the IEEE Code of Ethics each year when renewing

membership. See infra text accompanying note 121.
23. One of us previously identified various myths promoted by the AV industry as a
technique to persuade elected officials to adopt a regulatory stance favorable to AV
testing and deployment. See Philip Koopman, Autonomous Vehicle Myths: The Dirty Dozen,
EETIMEs (Oct. 22. 2021), https://www.eetimes.com/autonomous-vehicle-myths-the-dirtydozen/#.
24. See, e.g., IEEE CODE OF ETHICS, infra note 123 (noting with respect to technologies,
including intelligent systems, there is an obligation "to be honest, and realistic in stating
claims or estimates based on available data").
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Part IV identifies a political problem we call "autonomandering" 2 1-in
which AV industry participants lobby elected officials in rural parts of a
state (with less traffic density) to approve permissive and pre-emptive AV
legislation which exposes constituents in urban areas (with greater traffic
density) to a disproportionate increased risk of harm as compared with
rural constituents. This problem provides an instance in which AV
technology regulation presents a challenge for the democratic process-a
general concern raised by the ethics standards that Al development and
implementation not adversely impact either democracy or the rule of law.2 6
Part V presents an alternate path forward. It first identifies
shortcomings in SAE J3016 27 as a safety standard. It then explains why a
slightly modified version of SAE J3018 28 ought to be used (instead of J3016)
as a foundation for law and regulation, with a focus on simplifying and
clarifying the scope of laws and regulations governing AV safety in testing
and deployment.
We conclude with an appeal to the AV industry for a shift in its
approach to laws and regulation from an adversarial one to a cooperative
one as the best method to promote and sustain valuable AV technology.
One avenue for cooperation would be for the AV industry to engage in

25. We see this problem as related to the well-known problem of gerrymandering
Congressional districts. Our terminology is inspired by Liza Dixon, Autonowashing: The
Greenwashing of Vehicle Automation, TRANSP. RSCH. INTERDISC. PERSPS. (May 8, 2020),

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590198220300245
26. See Trustworthy Al Guidelines, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that "AI systems should serve
to maintain and foster democratic processes and respect the plurality of values and life
choices of individuals").
27. See SAE INT'L, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO DRIVING
AUTOMATION SYSTEMS FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES

J3016_202104

(2021) [hereinafter

J3016:2021], https://www.sae.org/standards/content/3016_202104/. We refer to prior
versions of this publication as: J3016:2018, J3016:2016, and J3016:2014. We use J3016
without a following year of publication as a generic reference to the series of publications
which all contain the same six level hierarchy of levels distinguishing different
capabilities of driving automation systems or features. Reference to an "SAE Level"
refers to a level described in J3016.
28. SAE INT'L, SAFETY-RELEVANT GUIDANCE FOR ON-ROAD TESTING OF PROTOTYPE

AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM (ADS)-OPERATED VEHICLES J3018_202012 (2020) [hereinafter

J3018], https://www.sae.org/standards/content/3018_202012/.
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negotiated rulemaking with NHTSA to mandate AV industry compliance
with applicable published engineering standards. 29
I.

TESLA'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LAW

Tesla's behavior often fails to engender trust, most notably in its
approach to testing its AV technology.3 0 The AV industry generally
conducts its public highway testing using specially trained employees as
backup safety drivers. The outlier to this testing approach is the maverick,
Tesla, who recently launched a wider distribution of its Full Self-Driving
(FSD) suite of autonomy features for selected customers. Tesla's approach
to safety eschews specially trained safety drivers, instead rolling out its
testing product to a limited, but expanding, group of its customers who
attain a sufficient "safe driver" score on a metric internally created by
Tesla.3 1 For some, the Tesla approach shows a similar concern with safety,
despite the absence of trained safety drivers.
For others, Tesla's approach is disturbing. Tesla's testing approach is
problematic for many reasons, but the original sin relates to what we
perceive as a deliberate misapplication of California law and regulations by
mischaracterizing its FSD beta features as SAE Level 2 when they really
qualify as more heavily regulated Level 4 under J3016. In fact, Tesla fails to
comply with law because the law and regulations, if read properly, do not
allow permit-less testing of autonomous vehicles with untrained drivers.

29. See, e.g., MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46756, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: IN

BRIEF 8 (2021) [hereinafter NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING]. Indeed, NHTSA has itself recently

suggested the "new approach[]" of using negotiated rulemaking in a partnership with
industry. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. [NHTSA], NHTSA 2020 REPORT:

PEOPLE SAVING PEOPLE (2020) [hereinafter NHTSA 2020 REPORT],
https://one.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/whatis/planning/2020Report/2020report.html.
30. Tesla has taken other actions which hinder development of trust such as
disseminating safety statistics that did not hold up under scrutiny. See, e.g., Edward

Niedermeyer, NHTSA's Flawed Autopilot Safety Study Unmasked, THE DRIVE (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.thedrive.com/tech/26455/nhtsas-flawed-autopilot-safety-studyunmasked (noting that "Tesla repeatedly puts out easily-debunked statistics and conceals
its data in a system with as little transparency and accountability as possible").
31. See Support: Safety ScoreBeta, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/support/safety-score (last

visited April 12, 2022).
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Both the Trustworthy Al Guidelines and the Trustworthy Al Policies
identify compliance with law as one of three foundational elements needed
to build trustworthy Al. 32 If this misapplication of law and regulation
remains unchallenged, the risk remains that other AV industry participants,
not only Tesla, may use this "loophole" to gain some advantage at the
expense of safety 33 (though we do not foresee other major AV industry
participants going so far as to use their own customers as "beta testers").
A. Importance of the SAE Level
One argument in support of legal compliance by Tesla's FSD beta
vehicles relies on classification of the FSD beta features as SAE Level 2. On
this reasoning, AVs must, by definition, qualify as SAE Level 3, 4 or 5; and,
only AVs (as so defined) are subject to these laws. Thus, by maintaining an
SAE Level 2 classification, Tesla hopes that FSD beta will avoid meaningful
regulation. When convenient, Tesla promotes the view that its vehicles'
features, including FSD beta, only qualify for SAE Level 2 classification.
In correspondence, Tesla has suggested this classification to the
California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) for its self-driving
technologies.3 4 Publicly available testing videos for FSD beta vehicles

32. See Trustworthy Al Guidelines, supra note 6, at 6; Trustworthy Al Policy, supra note 7, at
37. In those jurisdictions in which a rolling stop violates traffic law, Tesla's Full SelfDriving (FSD) beta may provide another instance of failure to comply with law. See
Emma Roth, Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' Beta Has an 'Assertive' Driving Mode That 'May

Perform Rolling Stops', THE VERGE (Jan. 9, 2022, 7:12 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/9/22875382/tesla-full-self-driving-beta-assertiveprofile; Kea Wilson, Why Tesla Can ProgramIts Cars to Break Road Safety Laws,
STREETSBLOG USA (Jan. 12, 2022), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2022/01/12/why-tesla-canprogram-its-cars-to-break-road-safety-laws/.
33. Another AV company, Embark Technology, Inc., may have violated California law
and regulations when it drove a truck autonomously on a circuit of roads around
Oakland as part of a due diligence demonstration for a public offering. See Northern
Genesis Acquisition Corp. II, Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-4), 7879 (Aug. 30, 2021) [hereinafter Embark S-4] (disclosing a technology demonstration by
Embark for its de-SPAC transaction),

https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1827980/000110465921111215/ngab20210830xs4a.htm.
34. See California DMV Tesla Robo-Taxi / FSD E-Mails, PLAINSITE (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.plainsite.org/documents/242a2g/california-dmv-tesla-robotaxi--fsd-emails/

(posting a response to a public records request).
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suggest," however, that these beta test drivers operate their vehicles as if to
validate SAE Level 4 features, often revealing dramatically risky situations
created by use of the vehicles in this manner. CNN recently independently
confirmed that operation of FSD technology represents a hazard based on
its own use of Tesla vehicles in Brooklyn.16 Lawmakers and regulators
should focus on this reality and recognize that FSD beta testing constitutes
SAE Level 4 testing on public roads. Because of this reality, FSD beta testers
should be subject to the same regulatory oversight as all other Level 4
testers to ensure the safety of road users and bystanders.
Moreover, seen in its true light, the sale of FSD beta vehicles may
constitute an unlawful deployment of AVs without applicable safety
standard compliance in California and, perhaps, some other jurisdictions.
(An alternate argument could be made that FSD beta testing is effectively
SAE Level 3 operation since that involves a subset of Level 4 capabilities,
but the net effect is the same.)
A great many aspects of regulation depend on SAE level. Only
"autonomous vehicles" are subject to specific statutory requirements on the
operation and deployment of autonomy features in California.3 7 A vehicle
does not qualify as an "autonomous vehicle" merely because it has driver

35. See, e.g., Jake Lingeman, Tesla's 'Full-SelfDriving' Update 10 Is Still Pretty Scary,
CARBUZZ (Sept. 14, 2021), https://carbuzz.com/news/teslas-full-self-driving-update-10-isstill-pretty-scary. There have been repeated incidents of Tesla FSD beta vehicles
attempting to turn left into oncoming traffic at significant speed (above 10 mph). For
example, defective turning behavior reproduced in both FSD beta 10.3 and FSD beta 10.4
with the same driver, the same, vehicle, and the same left turn. See Phil Koopman

(@PhilKoopman), TWITTER (Nov. 9, 2021, 7:25 AM),
https://twitter.com/PhilKoopman/status/1458063125194936320. In this case a left turn was
intended but was commanded by the automation despite detected oncoming traffic.
Also, FSD exhibited defective turning behavior that deviates from a straight trip route. In
this case the FSD beta 10.4 system fails to detect an illuminated "no left turn" traffic sign.

See Phil Koopman (@PhilKoopman), TWITTER (Nov. 17, 2021, 7:43 AM),
https://twitter.com/PhilKoopman/status/1460966916617641987.
36. CNN Tried Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' Mode on NYC Streets. It Didn't Go Great, CNN Bus.
(Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2021/11/17/tesla-3-full-selfdriving-mode-test-mc-zw-orig.cnn-business (posting video of CNN team using FSD on a
busy street in Brooklyn).

37. See CAL.

CODE

§ 38750, supra note 14.
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assistance features, such as collision avoidance systems. 38 The current
California statute and DMV regulations specifically reference the SAE
taxonomy for driving automation systems, limiting the scope of the term
'autonomous vehicle' to Levels 3, 4 and 5.39

B. Why FSB Beta Vehicles are SAE Level 4
1. A Comparison of Tesla Statements with J3016
A comparison of Tesla's public statements with SAE standards
document J3016 establishing the criteria for assigning a level to an
automated vehicle demonstrates that FSD beta testing constitutes SAE
Level 4 testing on public roads. Consider first Tesla's description of its Full
Self Driving Capability:
All new Tesla cars have the hardware needed in the future for
full self-driving in almost all circumstances. The system is

designed to be able to conduct short and long distance trips with no
action required by the person in the driver's seat.
The future use of these features without supervision is
dependent on achieving reliability far in excess of human
drivers as demonstrated by billions of miles of experience, as
well as regulatory approval, which may take longer in some
jurisdictions. As these self-driving capabilities are introduced,
your car will be continuously upgraded through over-the-air
software updates.4 0
SAE J3016:20214 1 defines Level 4 capability as "[t]he sustained and ODDspecific performance by an ADS of the entire DDT and DDT fallback

38. See CAL. CODE § 38750(a)(2)(B), supra note 14.
39. CAL. CODE § 38750, supra note 14; CAL. CODE REGS., supra note 14. The California
regulation incorporates the 2016 version of the SAE taxonomy by reference whereas the
newly amended § 38750 incorporates the 2021 version. By its terms, J3016:2021, supra note
27, supersedes prior versions of the taxonomy, which has remained essentially the same
across versions, with levels of autonomy capability from Level 0 to Level 5. The
important concept of "design intent" was introduced in J3016:2016, the first revision, and
continues in the 2018 and 2021 revisions. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99.
40. Future of Driving, TESLA (emphasis added), https://www.tesla.com/autopilot (last

visited April 12, 2022).
41. We refer to J3016:2021, supra note 27, in our discussion. On our analysis, this most
recent version is substantively equivalent in all relevant aspects to J3016:2016 used by the
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without any expectation that a user will need to intervene."4 2 Further, "[t]he
level of a driving automation system feature corresponds to the feature's
production design intent."4 3
As shown by the following table, Tesla's description of its FSD
capability matches the SAE J3016:2021 requirements for Level 4. An
explanation of SAE J3016:2021 terms follows the table.
SAE 13016 Requirement

Tesla Description

"sustained"

"conduct short and long distance trips"

"ODD-specific performance"

"almost all circumstances"

"by an ADS"

"All new Tesla cars have the hardware
needed" and "software updates"

"the entire DDT"

"conduct short and long distance trips
with no action required by the person in
the driver's seat"

"DDT Fallback"

"conduct short and long distance trips
with no action required by the person in
the driver's seat"

"without any expectation that a
user will need to intervene"

"no action required by the person in the
driver's seat"

"design intent"

"The system is designed to be able to
conduct"

The requirement that performance must be "sustained" is distinguished
from momentary intervention during potentially hazardous situations,
such as electronic stability control and automated emergency braking, and
certain types of driver assistance systems, such as lane keeping assistance,

DMV in the California Code of Regulations. See infra notes 187-199 and accompanying
text.

42. J3016:2021, supra note 27, at 17 tbl.1. The definition in J3016:2016 is identical, but we
refer to the newest released version of the standard in this discussion because the
California legislature has recently incorporated it by reference in its autonomous vehicle
statute, even though the DOT regulations still refer to J3016:2016. Relevant differences
between the 2016 and 2021 versions are discussed later in Part V, but do not change our
analysis.

43. J3016:2021, supra note 27, § 8.2, at 36.
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because these features do not perform part or all the Dynamic Driving Task
(DDT) on a sustained basis.
"ODD" stands for "Operational Design Domain" which is the
environment and other limited circumstances in which a Level 4 vehicle is
intended to operate. By way of contrast, a Level 5 vehicle is designed to
operate in all circumstances.
"ADS" stands for "Automated Driving System". An ADS performs the
automated driving task, comprising both computer hardware and software.
By way of contrast, a driver assistance feature, such as cruise control, does
not drive the vehicle but merely assists the driver. Tesla's description of its
FSD capability initially omits a reference to software, perhaps attempting
to distinguish its product from Level 4. However, hardware alone does not
comprise an ADS and the later reference to "software updates" confirms
the presence of initial software and an intent to continuously upgrade FSD
capabilities.
"DDT" stands for "Dynamic Driving Task". The DDT includes steering
and speed control, but not destination selection. To perform this task, the
ADS which supports the DDT must, among other things, monitor the
driving environment by object and event detection, recognition, and
response formulation.
"DDT Fallback" stands for the process of bringing a vehicle to a safe
state (for example, stopping on the shoulder of a road) following a failure
of some aspect of the ADS, as well as the occurrence of other conditions
reasonably expected for some trips (for example, a broken axle). In a Level
4 vehicle, the DDT Fallback is handled by the vehicle, not a human driver.
Even if Tesla's eventual deployment contemplates that its users are
expected to handle DDT Fallback, at most that merely reduces the FSD beta
vehicle to Level 3-a level which is still subject to regulation as an AV.
Based on this analysis, Tesla's description of the FSD's intended design
capability clearly describes an SAE Level 4 feature. Tesla ought not avoid
regulation by the label it self-assigns to its vehicles.
2. Irrelevance of the Presence of a Human Driver to SAE Level
The presence of a human driver does not preclude an FSD beta vehicle
from Level 4 classification, as the current version of J3016 makes clear in
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Section 8.2 (a point emphasized by one of the authors elsewhere as "Myth
10" about using the SAE Levels to classify vehicle automation)4 4 :
The level of a driving automation system feature corresponds to
the feature's production design intent. This applies regardless
of whether the vehicle on which it is equipped is a production
vehicle already deployed in commerce, or a test vehicle that has
yet to be deployed. As such, it is incorrect to classify a Level 4
design-intended ADS feature equipped on a test vehicle as
Level 2 simply because on-road testing requires a test driver
to supervise the feature while engaged, and to intervene if
necessary to maintain operation.45
The SAE J3016:2021 Section 8.2 criteria for assigning SAE Level 4 hinge
on design intent. If the manufacturer's design intent is Level 4, then it is a
Level 4 vehicle even if there is a test driver to supervise while the feature is
engaged and intervene when necessary. Significantly, a vehicle can qualify
as Level 4 even if its hardware and software are not a particularly
competent or safe instantiation of Level 4 technology.4 6 That, we suggest, is
the reality of the current situation, and why regulatory oversight of FSD
beta is critical.
Tesla's description of the FSD feature makes it quite clear that Tesla has
Level 4 design intent: "The system is designed to be able to conduct short
and long distance trips with no action required by the person in the driver's
seat." 47 In contrast, at Level 2 the driver is required to "complete the OEDR
subtask" portion of the DDT, which involves Object and Event Detection
and Response.48 The whole point of FSD, as generally represented by Tesla's
marketing materials and public messaging, is that the driver no longer

44. Philip Koopman, SAE J3016 User Guide, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.,
https://users.ece.cmu.edu/-koopman/j3016/#mythlO (last updated Sept. 4, 2021); see also
infra Part III.

45. J3016:2021, supra note 27, § 8.2, at 36.
46. A safe, competent Level 4 design is one where the driver should be able to literally go
to sleep during the journey and expect to be acceptably safe even if equipment fails, and
not be under any burden to monitor or take over operation to ensure safety. By way of
contrast a vehicle that requires frequent driver intervention to avoid a fatal crash is a
Level 4 vehicle so long as the design intent is to eventually get better.
47. See Future of Driving, supra note 40.

48. J3016:2021, supra note 27, at 17 tbl. 1.
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needs to drive (that is, the FSD feature actually fully self-drives), which
necessarily removes the OEDR subtask burden from the human driver.
C. Tesla's Acknowledgment that Some of its Customers Beta Test
As to whether the person in the driver's seat qualifies as a "test driver,"
Tesla itself is calling such drivers FSD "beta testers." Tesla has been
accepting and granting electronic applications for testers via a beta test
request button, and has been giving access selectively, making such further
distribution an expansion of a test program rather than a wide public
release.
While Tesla hopes to reassure the public by saying that only good
drivers will receive permission to test FSD beta, this only reinforces the
notion that FSD beta is a selectively released pre-production test system,
and not a road-ready full production feature. In other words, Tesla is
having selected but untrained civilian drivers do on-road testing of their
"beta" SAE Level 4 FSD features. This combination of vehicle plus amateur
test driver arrangement has been documented to drive recklessly and
otherwise behaves dangerously on public roads. 49
When the FSD beta vehicle is properly recognized as a Level 4 capable
vehicle, testing becomes a problem under the California statutes and
regulations because this beta testing does not comply with law, as outlined
in the next subsection.

D. Analysis of the Statute and Regulations
Under California law, "'[a]utonomous vehicle' means any vehicle
equipped with autonomous technology that has been integrated into that
vehicle that meets the definition of Level 3, Level 4, or Level 5 of SAE
International's 'Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving
Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles, standard J3016
(APR2021),' as may be revised."5 0 And "'[a]utonomous technology' means

49. Even worse, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that the driver who
"earned" the safety score is actually behind the wheel during "testing." As an example,
one social media video states that a driver borrowed his neighbor's Tesla with FSD beta
and shows him running a stop sign without even slowing down. See Kyle Conner

(@itskyleconner), TWITTER (Oct. 26, 2021, 1:41 PM),
https://twitter.com/itskyleconner/status/1453069194799501323.
50. 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 277 § 1(a)(2)(A) (S.B. 500) (West) (updating CAL. CODE
§ 38750, supra note 14). Before the September 23 amendment, the term 'Autonomous
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technology that has the capability to drive a vehicle without the active
physical control or monitoring by a human operator." 51 A Tesla vehicle with
FSD beta satisfies these definitions because, based on Tesla's marketing
statements-and various videos posted online by Tesla FSD beta testers52_
FSD-beta-equipped vehicles are capable of driving without active physical
control or monitoring. Though Tesla's instructions stipulate that the human
driver must constantly monitor driving, the instruction does not make FSD
beta vehicles any less capable of driving without human control or
monitoring. 53
The law is about "capability" and not about the instructions in a manual.
FSD beta goes beyond the sort of collision avoidance or driver assistance
systems that do not make a vehicle "autonomous."5 4

Vehicle' meant "any vehicle equipped with autonomous technology that has been
integrated into that vehicle." See CAL. CODE § 38750, supra note 14.

51. CAL. CODE § 38750(a)(1), supra note 14.
52. Mahmood Hikmet, Tesla FSD Beta Danger Compilation, YouTuBE (Nov. 11, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmoroFK1A_o.
53. See, e.g., Support: Full Self-Driving Capability Subscriptions, TESLA,
https://www.tesla.com/support/full-self-driving-subscriptions#faq (last visited April 12,
2022) ("Note: These features are designed to become more capable over time; however
the currently enabled features do not make the vehicle autonomous. The currently
enabled features require a fully attentive driver, who has their hands on the wheel and is

prepared to take over at any moment.").
54. See CAL. CODE § 38750(a)(2)(B), supra note 14 ("An autonomous vehicle does not
include a vehicle that is equipped with one or more collision avoidance systems,
including, but not limited to, electronic blind spot assistance, automated emergency
braking systems, park assist, adaptive cruise control, lane keep assist, lane departure
warning, traffic jam and queuing assist, or other similar systems that enhance safety or
provide driver assistance, but are not capable, collectively or singularly, of driving the vehicle
without the active control or monitoring of a human operator." (Emphasis added)) The
exception appears simply to make clear that traditional driver assistance systems do not
render a vehicle "autonomous" because they do not drive, but merely assist. Again, the

key is capability, and FSD beta has this capability.
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So, by statute, the Tesla FSD beta is an "autonomous vehicle" because
of its capabilities which satisfy the SAE criteria for Level 3 or 4. The
California DMV regulations contain a further clarification for an
"autonomous test vehicle":
For the purposes of this article, an "autonomous test vehicle"
is equipped with technology that makes it capable of
operation that meets the definition of Levels 3, 4, or 5 of the
SAE International's Taxonomy and Definitionsfor Terms Related

to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,
standard 13016 (SEP2016), which is hereby incorporated by
reference.5 5
Thus, if Tesla FSD beta is merely Level 2, it is not an autonomous test
vehicle and would not be an autonomous vehicle subject to regulation. But
the picture changes when FSD beta vehicles are properly recognized as
Level 3 or 4 because its "beta testing" program no longer complies with law.
A statutory autonomous vehicle may be operated on public roads in
California for "testing purposes" by a driver possessing the proper class of
license if three conditions are met:
1. The autonomous vehicle is being operated on roads in this
state solely by employees, contractors, or other persons
designated by the manufacturer of the autonomous technology.
2. The driver shall be seated in the driver's seat, monitoring
the safe operation of the autonomous vehicle, and capable of
taking over immediate manual control of the autonomous
vehicle in the event of an autonomous technology failure or
other emergency.
3. Prior to the start of testing in this state, the manufacturer
performing the testing shall obtain an instrument of
insurance, surety bond, or proof of self-insurance in the
amount of five million dollars ($5,000,000), and shall provide

55. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.02(a)(2) (2008); accord CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 228.02
(b) (2008) (stating that the definition of "autonomous vehicle" meets SAE Levels 3, 4, or
5). An argument could be made that every Tesla vehicle with the hardware required to
support FSD, including especially every vehicle for which customers have paid for FSD
even if not yet authorized for beta operation, meets this requirement because it is
equipped with the hardware technology to provide that capability even if not enabled by
software.
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evidence of the insurance, surety bond, or self-insurance to
the department in the form and manner required by the
department pursuant to the regulations adopted pursuant to
subdivision (d).5 6
Tesla has satisfied subsection (3) by virtue of having obtained a license
in California to test with a driver.5 7 Tesla will argue that it satisfies
subsection (2) by virtue of certain of Tesla's statements, including in
owner's manual instructions to its FSD beta customers to stay alert, ready
to always take over control of the vehicle. And with respect to subsection
(1), Tesla will argue that it has designated its customers to do the testing
because of its selective rollout of FSD beta and its qualifications which allow
only a limited number of its customers to participate in the "beta testing."
But it is not clear that Tesla's FSD beta customers do, in fact, qualify as
"designees": Pursuant to regulation, "'[d]esignee' means the natural person
identified by the manufacturer to the department as an autonomous vehicle test
driver authorized by the manufacturer to drive or operate the manufacturer's

autonomous test vehicles on public roads."5 8
Thus, there are two considerations. First, has Tesla sufficiently identified
its FSD beta customers to the DMV as "autonomous vehicle test drivers"?
We are not aware of Tesla making any such designation of test drivers to
the DMV (unless Tesla's public remarks qualify). Second-and more
importantly-are Tesla's FSD beta testers operating the "manufacturer's
autonomous test vehicles?" It seems that they are not: the FSD beta
customers are operating their own vehicles, and not those that belong to
Tesla. The regulatory scheme contemplates that testing of autonomous
technology be limited to a manufacturer's vehicles, and that such
technology would be deployed to the public only after testing had been
completed. Perhaps the regulatory scheme looks the way it does because it
never occurred to the legislature or the DMV that any manufacturer would
be so bold (or reckless) as to use its own customers as test drivers.

56. CAL. CODE § 38750(b), supra note 14 (emphasis added).
57. Autonomous Vehicle Testing Permit Holders, STATE OF CAL. DMV,
https://www.dmv. ca.gov/portal/vehicle-industry-services/autonomousvehicles/autonomous-vehicle-testing-permit-holders/ (last visited April 12, 2022).

58. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 13, § 227.02(e) (2008) (emphasis added).
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Further, California regulations provide minimum qualifications for
autonomous vehicle test drivers, including three years of licensure, not
more than one violation point count, not having been at fault in any
accident resulting in injury or death, no convictions in the prior 10 years for
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and completion of the
manufacturer's autonomous vehicle test driver program. 59 Because Tesla
does not verify the driving records of its FSD beta testers, and does not
require them to complete an autonomous vehicle test driver program, it
seems unlikely that any FSD beta tester would qualify as a designee.
To the extent that Tesla's FSD beta customers do not qualify as
designees, they cannot be involved in "testing" FSD features; that is, they
cannot operate "an autonomous vehicle on public roads ... for the purpose
of assessing, demonstrating, and validating the autonomous technology's
capabilities."6 0 If an autonomous vehicle is not being operated for testing
purposes, it "shall not be operated on public roads until the manufacturer
submits an application" to the DMV, and the DMV approves it.6 1 We are
not aware of any such application or approval. Thus, it seems that, with
respect to its FSD beta testing program, Tesla is deploying autonomous
vehicles in violation of regulations.62
California's statutory and regulatory schemes appear designed to
facilitate the development of new technologies while protecting the public
from the dangers posed by immature technologies. In using its customers
to test FSD beta, Tesla disregards these policy judgments. Pursuant to
regulation, an autonomous vehicle shall not be deployed on any public
road in California until the manufacturer has submitted, and the DMV

59. Id. § 227.34.
60. Id. § 227.02(o).
61. CAL. CODE § 38750(c), supra note 14. The required contents of an application are set
forth by statute. See id.

62. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 228.02(c) (2008) (defining "deployment" of an autonomous
vehicle as "the operation of an autonomous vehicle on public roads by members of the
public who are not employees, contractors, or designees of a manufacturer or for

purposes of sale, lease, providing transportation services or transporting property for a
fee, or otherwise making commercially available outside of a testing program.").
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approved, an Application for a Permit to Deploy Autonomous Vehicles on
Public Streets, form OL 321 (Rev. 7/2020).63
E. Tesla's Communications with the DMV
Our conclusion does not change based on representations that Tesla
made to California regulators to the effect that its vehicles are SAE Level 2,
a classification presumably made to avoid regulatory oversight and
permitting processes required of more highly automated vehicles,
including Level 4 vehicles.
An analysis of released e-mails between Tesla and the California DMV
reveals that Tesla left itself room to maneuver by careful word choice.6 4
"

"

"

Tesla promised "we won't deploy any autonomous vehicle feature
without a deployment permit."6 However, Tesla might not consider
a "test" program to be a "deployment", so this statement does not
necessarily apply to FSD beta.
FSD is a distinct feature from AutoPilot (AP). AP is included
standard in all newer Tesla vehicles, whereas FSD requires an
additional fee, confirming that there are two separate products.
Thus, statements regarding AP being Level 2 do not necessarily bear
on FSD because they are distinct and different product features.
(SAE J3016:2021 states that a Level is associated with a feature, not
the entire vehicle. AP can be at Level 2 while FSD is at Level 4.)
The Tesla letter of November 20, 2020,66 limits its discussion to
current capabilities, and not design intent, whereas design intent is
the crux of SAE levels. (It is worth noting that the letter refers to "the
small handful of non-employee drivers in the pilot." 67 This number

63. Id. § 228.06(a) (governing post-testing deployment).
64. See PLAINSITE, supra note 34.
&

65. Email from Al Prescott, Chief Legal Officer, Tesla, to Brian G. Soublet, Deputy Dir.

Chief Couns., Cal. DMV (Dec. 20, 2019 11:17 AM) (available at PLAINSITE, supra note 34).
66. Letter from Eric C. Williams, Assoc. Gen. Couns. - Reg., Tesla, to Miguel Acosta,

Chief, Autonomous Vehicles Branch - Cal. DMV (Nov. 20, 2020) (available at PLAINSITE,
supra note 34).

67. Id. at 3; see also Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (Sept. 17, 2021, 8:43 PM),
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1439042334155497474 (claiming that 2000 beta users
had been operating in the year following that letter.
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increased to almost 12,000 beta testers as of October 29, 2021,68 and
had increased to approximately 60,000 as reflected in Tesla's fourth

)

quarter and fiscal year 2021 update, with potentially many more
coming soon. 69
The closest Tesla comes to an SAE Level statement is the imprecise
notion that Tesla "continues to firmly root the vehicle in SAE Level
2 capability." 70 But that is not a statement that the technology is Level
2. It means that Tesla's path to Level 4 starts at Level 2. That simply
reflects the reality of an evolution in capabilities from AP (which is
Level 2) to FSD (which is really Level 4).
The Tesla letter of December 14, 202071 refers to a "final release" and
release "to the general public" being SAE Level 2, rather than
characterizing the level of current beta releases to selected testers.
Indeed, Tesla might never issue a "final release," instead keeping
FSD in beta indefinitely, offering the feature to essentially all

"

"

"qualified" Tesla owners, thus technically avoiding a "deployment."
Or it might rebrand FSD one day and declare the functionality
formerly known as FSD to then be a "new" Level 4 feature.
A complete analysis of the disclosed documents posted at PLAINSITE is
beyond the scope of this Article. But we were unable to find any
unambiguous statement by Tesla that the FSD beta program is at SAE Level
2, as opposed to the characterization of the anticipated "final release." (In
any event, any such statement about FSD beta, if made, would be incorrect
on our analysis.)
F. The Regulatory Corner
Tesla has painted itself into a regulatory corner. If Tesla denies a design
intent that its FSD beta feature satisfies SAE Level 4 capability, Tesla's

68. NHTSA, PART 573 SAFETY RECALL REPORT, 21V-846, OMB CONTROL No.: 2127-0004
(2021) (noting 11,704 vehicles potentially affected),
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2021/RCLRPT-2V846-7836.PDF.
69. TESLA, Q4 AND FY2021 UPDATE at 10, available at https://teslacdn.thron.com/static/WIIG2L_TSLA_Q4_2021_UpdateO7MYNE.pdf. This number will
increase as Tesla grants more customers access to FSD technology.
70. See PLAINSITE, supra note 34; see also Letter from Eric C. Williams to Miguel Acosta,
supra note 66. In our view, Tesla's wording is deliberately vague by suggesting that
vehicles are Level 2 without making an express statement to this effect. The express
statement might be false, as we suggest in the case of FSD.
71. See Letter from Eric C. Williams to Miguel Acosta, supra note 66.
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pervasive statements and messaging strategy to customers purchasing
FSD-suggesting that FSD-equipped vehicles are, in fact, capable of full
self-driving--would be misleading. Tesla simply must have the design
intent to develop and perfect Level 4 technology (and be in the process of
honoring its promises to its customers by testing Level 4 features). To
produce truly safe Level 4 technology for general release to the public,
common practice would first test Level 4 technology that is less capable.
Indeed, Level 4 performance would be expected to improve over time. For
regulatory purposes, given the applicable statutory definitions, it simply
will not suffice to deny actual design intent to build either a Level 3 or Level
4 vehicle because those definitions turn, in the first instance, on capabilitywhich the FSD beta vehicle possesses at Level 4 and Tesla must test prior to
a full public deployment.
The only thing that saves Tesla from the California scheme of regulatory
oversight is the willingness of the California regulators, for whatever
reasons, to continue to take Tesla's classification of its FSD technology as
Level 2 at face value.72 But as explained above, there is every reason to reject
such a classification by carefully parsing the language of J3016, together
with the statutory and regulatory definitions.
For the reasons outlined above, state departments of transportation
around the United States should classify the Full Self-Driving beta releases
as an SAE Level 4 feature, with applicable regulatory and operational
guidance applied accordingly based on individual state laws and
regulations. 73

72. See Hyunjoo Jin, San FranciscoRaises Tesla 'Self-Driving' Safety Concerns As Public Test
Nears, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2021, 5:57 PM), https://www.reuters.com/business/autostransportation/san-francisco-raises-tesla-self-driving-safety-concerns-public-test-nears2021-09-23/ (noting that California's state regulator recently said: "Based on information
Tesla has provided the DMV, the feature does not make the vehicle an autonomous
vehicle per California regulations."). Upon the request of California state Senator
Gonzalez, the California DMV has announced that it is re-evaluating its positions with
respect to Tesla. See Letter from Steve Gordon, Dir., Cal. DMV, to Hon. Lena A. Gonzalez,
Chair, Senate Comm. on Transp. (Jan. 7, 2022) (available at Andrew J. Hawkins, California
Is 'Revisiting' Tesla's Full Safe-Driving Beta In Light of 'Dangerous'Videos, THE VERGE (Jan.

12, 2022, 1:42 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/12/22880305/tesla-fsd-betacalifornia-dmv-autonomous-vehicle-letter).
73. Though we focus on laws and regulations in California in this article, other states and
the District of Columbia have adopted laws and regulations which are capable of

191

UCLA J.L. & TECH.

2022

Vol. 27:3

Testing potentially dangerous products on public highways cannot, as
a matter of policy, properly be addressed as an exercise in wordplay,
labeling sophisticated technology as merely Level 2 while looking the other
way. Public safety-and the earning of public trust-requires more. The
fact that Tesla approaches safety regulation as a classification game to be
won or lost, without considering the safety consequences of winning this
game, provides a reason to withhold trust. Flouting the application of duly
enacted laws and regulations provides a signature example of a trust
destroying failure to comply with law.
II.

AURORA'S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A DEPLOYMENT STANDARD

The AV industry must answer a practical ethical question: How will a
company know when its AV technology is safe enough to deploy at scale? 74
We call this question, the "AV Problem." Aurora Innovation, Inc. (Aurora)
and the AV industry more generally, might use IEEE 700075 to address this
problem. Nevertheless, as explained in this Part II, neither Aurora nor other
AV industry participants wish to publicly state how they will address the
AV Problem. What level of safety does the AV industry aim to achieve for
a first deployment?
This Part considers the AV Problem through the lens of a November 5,
2021, filing by Aurora of a registration statement on Form S-1 76 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Aurora hopes to be a leader in
systems for AVs. 77
The Aurora S-1 reveals a potentially significant material omission: it
fails clearly to disclose Aurora's internal standard for initially deploying

manipulation by using what we call the "Level 2 loophole" because they define an
automated vehicle by reference to SAE Levels 3, 4 or 5. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 50-

2351(1A) (West 2021).
74. See, e.g., Patrick McGee, Robotaxis: Have Google and Amazon Backed the Wrong

Technology?, FIN. TIMES (July 18, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/46ff4fe4-0ae6-4f68902c-3fd14d294d72 (subscription required) ("Since Google launched its self-driving car
project in 2009, the biggest challenge has been one of technology: can it be safe enough to
deploy at scale?").

75. See IEEE 7000, supra note 5.
76. See Aurora S-1, supra note 1.
77. Id. at 85 (describing the plan to be a global leader in self-driving technology); see also
Reinvent S-4, supra note 1, at 245.
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AVs at scale. Development of technology satisfying a more stringent safety
standard takes longer to develop than technology meeting a lesser
standard. The Aurora S-1 makes clear that Aurora must deploy AV
technology quickly for financial success. For this reason, Aurora's
deployment standard is material and its omission a potential violation of
securities laws. 78 Beyond the apparent securities law violation (another
trust destroying feature), however, the failure to identify the applicable
standard for deployment makes it impossible for Aurora to satisfy the
requirements of IEEE 7000.
IEEE 7000 aims to support companies in creating ethical value through
system design. "Creating ethical value is a vision for organizations that
recognizes their central role in society as shapers of well-being and carriers
of societal progress that benefits humanity. Implementing IEEE Std 7000
can help [a company] to strengthen [its] value proposition and avoid value
harm." 79 IEEE 7000 supports an organization's efforts to behave ethically
and create ethical value through system design by setting forth internal
processes and procedures conducive to production of ethical results and
promoting ethical treatment of persons. This allows technologists to "align
products and services with the results valued by acquirers, consumers, and

users."80
IEEE 7000 applies to all kinds of products and services, including Al
systems-the category into which AV technology falls. It envisions a "Case
for Ethics"8 1 -which is like a safety case8 2-to
provide a structured account
of the ethical and technical activities undertaken while pursuing an
ethically aligned design for a system of interest. It serves as a project
memory and an auditable repository. It ensures that a company is mindful

78. See Widen, supra note 21.

79. IEEE 7000, supra note 5, at 9.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 74. An AV system of interest might be ethically aligned along utilitarian
principles which justifies deployment based on a cost-benefit analysis, for example.
82. A safety case is a structured logical argument, supported by evidence, that a system
will be acceptably safe. See, e.g., Nancy Leveson, White Paper on the Use of Safety Cases
in Certification and Regulation, Aeronautics and Astronautics/Engineering Systems, MIT

(undated) (excerpted in J. of Sys. Safety Nov./Dec. 2011),
http://sunnyday.mit.edu/SafetyCases.pdf.
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of ethical considerations at each stage of product life and identifies all
relevant stakeholders.
An important metric of system design for AV technology is how the
safety of the new technology compares with the safety of a human driver.
As an example of the application of IEEE 7000 to development of AV
technology, IEEE 7000's "Transparency Management Process" identifies
the ethical value of transparency as requiring the provision of information
to all stakeholders (internal and external, short-term and long-term) about
how the developer of an Al system has addressed ethical concerns during
design. 3 The public, including drivers, pedestrians and cyclists, are
relevant stakeholders because the new AV technology impacts their safety
and well-being. The ethical standard at a minimum requires disclosure of
the deployment standard (if not all the details of how that performance
standard will be achieved) and not mere assurances that the technology will
be deployed when it is acceptably safe or safe enough. 4
A. Urgency of the AV Problem
The AV Problem needs an answer now, more so than other ethical issues
for AV design raised by the famous "Trolley Problem"" or the results of
MIT's experimental philosophy poll about "Moral Machines." 6 We face
issues similar to the AV Problem now on a smaller scale with current testing
of AV technology on our public highways, 87 where high profile fatalities

83. IEEE 7000, supra note 5, at 49.
84. An interview with Chris Urmson, Aurora's CEO, illustrates the rhetoric of
"sufficiently safe" used by industry participants. See Jerry Hirsch, Autonomous Vehicle
Pioneer Urmson Talks About Safety and Risks, TRUCKS (June 22, 2020),
https://www.trucks.com/2020/06/22/autonomous-vehicle-risks-urmson/.

85. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985). The name
"Trolley Problem" comes from an ethical dilemma where one must make a choice
whether or not to pull a lever to direct a trolley onto a track with one worker and away
from a track with five, when either choice is fatal to those persons who are hit. It is based

on scenarios originally presented by Philippa Foot in 1967. Id. at 1395.
86. See Edmond Awad et al., The Moral Machine Experiment, 563 NATURE 59 (2018).
87. Greg Bensinger, Opinion, Why Tesla's 'Beta Testing' Puts the Public at Risk, N.Y. TIMES

(July 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/30/opinion/self-driving-cars-tesla-elonmusk.html.
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involving AVs already have occurred. 88 Moreover, even as many anecdotal
accounts of failures of Level 2 technology 89 get headlines, AV companies
aim to deploy the more complex Level 4 technology as soon as 2023.90
B. Absence of a Clear Deployment Standard Creates Uncertainty
As an example, posit a simple safety rating scale based on number of
miles driven without a fatality by an average human driver, expressed on a
scale of 1 to 5.91 Application of this scale illustrates in a simple way the
problem caused by the absence of a clear deployment standard. Assume the
hypothetical average human driver rates a 3 on this scale. Machine drivers
rate a 2 for modest safety improvement over the average human driver, and
a 1 for significant improvement in safety. A 4 represents a modest decrease
in safety from the average human driver, and 5 a significant decrease in
safety.
In principle, Aurora must choose one of two options. Option One: it
could keep its deployment standard vague to preserve its deployment
options in case financial exigency necessitates a risky premature
deployment (less safe than a human driver, at perhaps a 4 or even a 5 on
our hypothetical scale). Option Two: it could build trust by announcing that

88. See, e.g., Bryan Pietsch, 2 Killed in Driverless Tesla Car Crash, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/18/business/tesla-fatal-crashtexas.html.
89. Tim Levin, Tesla's Full Self-Driving Tech Keeps Getting Fooled by the Moon, Billboards, and

Burger King Signs, Bus. INSIDER (July 26, 2021, 11:30 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/sai (use website search feature to find article using the
article title).
90. See, e.g., Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 83 (indicating a target deployment date for the
trucking industry of late 2023).
91. Any scale used in actual practice needs to address many other details, such as
whether the concept of average human driver should exclude impaired persons, and
how the road condition of miles driven in testing compares to miles driven as reflected in
government statistics. Indeed, a standard of expert human driver would be a better goal
than average human driver, and consistent with standards used to test some other
automotive systems. See, e.g., INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 26262-12:2018, annex
C.4 (2018) (measuring positive risk balance for motorcycles with reference to expert
drivers rather than average drivers).
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deployment will only occur after Aurora can justify a safety case that its AV
technology rates a 1 for safety. 92
The standard that an AV technology be "safer than a human driver" (the
Safety Proposition) as a condition to initial deployment at scale appears
often in the AV discourse. As examples, Daniel Kahneman, a Nobel prize
winning behavioral economist, noted that, with respect to AV technology:
"[b]eing a lot safer than people is not going to be enough. The factor by
which they have to be more safe than humans is really very high."9 3 The
German Ethics Code states that the primary goal of AV technology ought
to be the promotion of safety and an overall positive balance of benefits
against burdens.9 4 This appears to be the standard that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration would apply if it produces
substantive regulations. 95 New York City's AV regulation uses a "better
than a human driver" standard. 6 Though it is not itself a safety standard,
J3016:2014 used a "better than a human driver" concept to describe the
standard for a high automation system to restore a vehicle to a minimum
risk condition as "with at least the level of performance that could be

92. A middling choice of deployment at a 3 rating, or even perhaps a 2 rating, would
conflict with public expectations that AV technology will achieve a significant safety
improvement and not be merely value neutral. It is not realistic that an AV company
would announce a goal of the status quo level of safety.
93. Tim Adams, Daniel Kahneman: 'Clearly Al Is Going to Win. How People Are Going to

Adjust Is a FascinatingProblem', THE

GUARDIAN

(May 16, 2021, 8:00 AM),

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/may/16/daniel-kahneman-clearly-ai-is-goingto-win-how-people-are-going-to-adjust-is-a-fascinating-problem-thinking-fast-andslow?msclkid=9174f6e7a6ec11eca0a1d3da029ec840 (reporting observations of Daniel
Kahneman).
94. Christoph Luetge, The German Ethics Codefor Automated and Connected Driving, 30
PHIL. & TECH. 547-58 (2017) (the "German Ethics Code").

95. Framework for Automated Driving System Safety, 85 Fed. Reg. 78,058, 78,060
(proposed Dec. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 571) (noting engineering measures
which would seek to show that ADS perform with a "high level of proficiency").
96. "New York City is implementing a permit process, including self-certifications from
autonomous vehicle technology companies that their autonomous vehicles will operate
more safely than human drivers in New York City... ." N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK tit. 34, ch. 4,

§ 4-17 (2021).
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expected from a human driver under the same conditions."9 7 Variations of
the Safety Proposition appear in many corners of the AV discourse.

&

The Aurora S-1 even notes this better-than-a-human-driver
performance standard as a risk factor: "[t]he industry can be characterized
by a significant number of technical and commercial challenges, including
an expectation for better-than-a-human driving performance .... "98 But
rather than stating its own deployment standard as better-than-a-human
driving performance, Aurora states its goal as "achieving sufficiently safe
self-driving system performance as determined by us, government
regulatory agencies, our partners, customers, and the general public." 99
The timing of application of the deployment standard, which Aurora
leaves opaque, is critical. Per IEEE 7000, "[o]rganizations that do not
explicitly define their ethical values are more likely to encounter ethical
issues, such as placing economic gain or privileges of a few above human
rights . ... "100 If Aurora publicly adopted a safety rating of 1, it would be
less likely to deploy at a rating of 4 or 5 when facing a financial exigency. A
deployment at a rating of 4 or 5 justified by the expectation of future
benefits might prove controversial, if not ethically questionable.
Option One preserves a harm now, benefits later utilitarian
justification 101 for early deployment of vehicles with high automation

97. SAE INT'L, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO ON-ROAD MOTOR

J3016_201401 10
https://www.sae.org/standards/content/3016_201401/.
VEHICLE AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS

(2014),

98. Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 7.
99. Id. A standard of "sufficiently safe" allows for lobbying efforts to convince regulators
to allow deployment on a harm now, benefits later analysis -a justification which, if
disclosed, might cause public outrage.
100. IEEE 7000, supra note 5, at 73 annex H. We do not suggest that deployment at a level
less than a rating of 1 would violate a human right. IEEE 7000 uses violation of a human
right as illustrative of a negative consequence of failure to explicitly define ethical values.

Id.
101. IEEE 7000 specifically identifies utilitarianism as an "[e]thical decision-making
approach to consider the consequences of system design and deployment (harms and
benefits)." Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Section 5.6 includes utilitarian ethics as one of
three used in the standard to help identify and prioritize values in accordance with the
standard. Id. at 30. The standard notes that general utilitarian ethics considers "the
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technology at an SAE rating of Level 3, 4, or 5 that is less safe than a human
driver in the near term but with the expectation that the technology will
become safer than a human driver in the long run. This is a classic trade-off
identified by IEEE 7000 as "[d]ecision-making actions that select from
various requirements and alternative solutions on the basis of net benefits
to the stakeholders." 1 02 If Aurora wants to elect Option One, IEEE 7000
requires public disclosure now in accord with its recommended value of
transparency so that an informed public debate might begin. The risk for
Aurora is that the public might not readily accept such a harm now, benefits
later justification for deployment. Moreover, there is no assurance that the
future benefits will materialize-further complicating any utilitarian
analysis.
IEEE 7000, however, values transparency, which includes transfer of
information to a stakeholder (here, the public) 103 and indicates the social
responsibility of an organization is an "[o]bligation to wider society to
respect the values reigning within it." 104 If the public as a stakeholder has
an interest that any deployment at scale of AV technology only occur if it is
safer than a human driver at the time of deployment, respect for this value
requires transparency in the form of disclosure, particularly if an
organization intends to go in a different direction. Indeed, without this
disclosure, it is difficult to even determine the public's appetite for a harm
now, benefits later approach.
Consistent with IEEE 7000, Option Two builds public trust if Aurora's
management must defend a safety case to rate its AV technology a 1 to an
independent committee of its board of directors before deployment. 105

consequences for both direct and indirect stakeholders in the short, middle, and long
terms." Id. at 58 annex C.
102. Id. at 22. IEEE 7000 is very clear that "society at large" and the "general public" are
considered stakeholders. Id. § 5.4, at 27.

103. Id. at 22.
104. Id. at 21.
105. Aurora has formed a Safety Advisory Board. However, there has been no public
commitment to grant that board veto power on a deployment decision the Safety Board
considers insufficiently safe. See Nat Beuse, Our Updated Safety Report and First-Ever Safety
Advisory Board, AURORA (June 2, 2021), https://aurora.tech/blog/aurora-shares-safetyreport (failing to describe the powers of the Safety Advisory Board). The safety advisory
board is not referenced in any of: Aurora Innovation, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation
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(IEEE 7000 recommends appointing project team members to various roles
to support value-based engineering efforts, 106 though it does not require
engagement of an ethics expert to conform to the standard.) 107 Adopting
corporate governance structures to protect the integrity of deployment
decisions, combined with a robust corporate ethics code, would work with
IEEE 7000 to strengthen a commitment to deploy only when evidence
justifies a claim that an overall safety improvement immediately follows
deployment. 108
Disclosing deployment standards in SEC filings provides additional
practical incentives against making safety a secondary concern in the face
of financial exigency. 109 Following IEEE 7000 makes an even stronger case
for trust while simultaneously conforming to a new industry standard.

(Form 8-K, Exhibit 3.1) (Nov. 3, 2021)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001828108/000119312521319524/d249044dex3
1.htm; Aurora Innovation, Inc., Bylaws (Form 8-K, Exhibit 3.2) (Nov. 3, 2021)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001828108/000119312521319524/d249044dex3
2.htm; Code of Conduct and Ethics, AURORA,

https://dlio3yog0oux5.cloudfront.net/_55e9196521 c7b242e94ca84f97b8d5e7/aurora/db/86
7/7487/file/Code+of+Conduct+and+Ethics.pdf (last visited April 12, 2022); or Corporate
Governance Guidelines, AURORA,

https://dlio3yog0oux5.cloudfront.net/_54cafb1a3202757f72937b6681f4bf93/aurora/db/867
/7488/file/Aurora+Corporate+Governance+Guidelines.pdf

(last visited April 12, 2022).

Given the lack of any formal role for the Safety Advisory Board, it is difficult to see how
it might operate as a substitute for compliance with IEEE 7000.
106. IEEE 7000, supra note 5, at 32-35. These roles include a "Value Lead" who bridges
the gap between engineering, management, and ethical values in a constructive way, a
"User Advocate" who represents the direct and indirect users of the system, and a
"Transparency Manager" who leads the communication of technical decisions and
system functions to stakeholders. A "System Expert" has the responsibility to listen to
stakeholders. Id. at 33. Aurora's Safety Advisor Board does not perform this function as it

does not appear to assign actual project team members within the company to perform
these important roles. See Beuse, supra note 105.

107. Id. at 26.
108. The standard does not purport to specify ethical requirements for non-engineering
areas of organizational governance and ethical policies. It only applies to structures
which directly affect the design of a system of interest. Id.
109. Indeed, some in the AV industry have suggested a "Safety Third" attitude which,
even if made in jest, raises concerns. See Max Chafkin & Mark Bergen, Fury Road: Did
Uber Steal the Driverless Future From Google?, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2017, 1:00 AM),
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The AV industry's mantra to date, as exemplified by the Aurora S-1, can
be summarized: just trust us, we are smart, we will do the right thing.1 1 0
When pressed, the AV industry references vague content-free standards
such as "sufficiently safe." 11 1 But announcing a meaningful deployment
standard and supporting that standard with deployment decision
procedures builds trust more effectively than naked appeals to trustwithout publicized standards for deployment and protective corporate
governance structures, a stronger case for regulation exists.
The AV industry resists regulation, arguing that regulations will
become outdated before becoming operational, slowing technological
progress,1 1 2 while simultaneously arguing a utilitarian case for early

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-16/fury-road-did-uber-steal-thedriverless-future-from-google (noting that "[s]omeone [at Otto, an AV company,] had
distributed stickers-in OSHA orange-with a tongue-in-cheek slogan: 'Safety third."').
110. The Aurora S-1 advances this message by assuring investors that Aurora does not
hire "jerks." Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 84.
111. See Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 7; see also Hirsch, supra note 84. A Rand study
explores the concept of "sufficiently safe" and how that determination might be made.
See MARJORY

S. BLUMENTHAL

ET AL., RAND CORP., SAFE ENOUGH: APPROACHES TO

ASSESSING ACCEPTABLE SAFETY FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES (2020),

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA500/RRA569-

1/RAND_RRA569-1.pdf.
112. See ISSUES IN AV TESTING, supra note 2, at 8.
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deployment." 3 Yet, the AV industry's recent BEST PRACTICE STATEMENT114
reveals no statistically significant metrics, standards, or data to back up any
utilitarian claim that current AV technology reduces highway fatalities or
that it will do so in the future. This violates the IEEE 7000 requirement of
verification, which demands "[c]onfirmation, through the provision of
objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled."1 1 5
The AV industry currently does not have an objective method to assess
the safety of AV technology relative to that of a human driver. Instead, the
AV industry conducts a mere public relations campaign using PAVE, its
501(c)(3) tax exempt organization, to convince the public of AV
technology's potential benefits.11 6 However, IEEE 7000 does not recognize
public relations efforts as relevant to ethical Al design (apart from a
commitment to transparency).

113. Chris Urmson, Aurora's CEO, echoes utilitarian justifications for rapid deployment
of AV technology when he suggests that delays in implementation of AV technology will
cost lives.
One of the parts that maybe gets a little bit lost is that we need to be careful and
thoughtful about what the threshold is that we accept of risk. We obviously want
to drive that to zero over time. But it's very easy to overlook the fact that the status
quo is broken. There's an incredible opportunity to move from the status quo
towards zero. We should be saving those lives along the way and not wait for the
perfect at the expense of all those lives.
Hirsch, supra note 84. This quotation is highly suggestive of urging a harm now, benefits
later justification for deployment of AV technology that, at the time of initial deployment,
is less safe than the average human driver.
114. SAE INT'L, AVSC BEST PRACTICE FOR METRICS AND METHODS FOR ASSESSING SAFETY
PERFORMANCE OF AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS (ADS) (2021) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICE

STATEMENT], https://www.sae.org/standards/content/avsc00006202103/.

115. IEEE 7000, supra note 5, at 23.
116. Individual automakers supplement this coordinated advertising campaign with their

.

own efforts. See, e.g., Path to Autonomous, GENERAL MOTORS,
https://www.gm.com/commitments/path-to-autonomous.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2022)
(profiling a chief AV engineer as a "mother of three children who will be driving soon, .
. motivated by the role AVs play in GM's vision of a world with Zero Crashes, Zero
Emissions and Zero Congestion"). GM hopes that referencing the support of a "mother of
three" will lead the public to conclude that AV technology is safe. One can only conclude,
however, that the mother of three is an engineer employed by GM who believes in AV
technology's potential.
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It is ironic that the Aurora S-1 places the goal of building "trust" as a
centerpiece of its business strategy yet makes purely hypothetical utilitarian
calculations concerning relative public safety without meaningful data.
Indeed, Aurora states its philosophy as "build and earn trust with
everything that we do." 117 Aurora's rhetoric aligns with the messaging of
PAVE. The AV industry recognizes that the public is wary of self-driving
technology safety, particularly as the industry increases testing on public
highways. Yet, Aurora takes care to make no commitment to a standard for
deployment of AV technology at scale to assure a concerned public. Aurora
apparently wants the flexibility to make a harm now, benefits later
justification without identifying that it is preserving this option.
C. The Moral Hazard
The presence of a moral hazard in the initial deployment decision is
corrosive of trust, further highlighting the importance of following IEEE
7000. A moral hazard exists because the corporate form used to operate
Aurora's business shields investors and management from personal
liability for the consequences of any mistaken decision by Aurora to deploy
AV technology at scale before it is safe to do so. 1 When Aurora must decide
whether to deploy or delay for more development and testing, its
management will face enormous financial pressure to deploy. The Aurora
S-1 suggests Aurora will have a market value of over $10 billion, though it
currently loses money, and will continue to lose money in the near term. 119
The Reinvent S-4 prepared for the shareholder vote prior to Aurora's IPO
indicated no positive EBITDA until projected free cash flow materializes in
2027.120 A reasonable assumption on the available financial information
presented is that, if deployment is delayed, Aurora will fail. 12 1

117. See Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 84. A better approach to building trust would answer
the deployment question directly, rather than populating the Aurora website with
volumes of essentially content free praise for a safety culture.
118. By "mistaken" decision, we mean "mistaken" from the vantage point of maximizing
social welfare. The moral hazards caused by the limited liability associated with
corporations is well known. See, e.g., William H. Widen, CorporateForm and Substantive

Consolidation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237 (2007).
119. Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 7.
120. Reinvent

S-4, supra note 1, at 30, 130-32.

121. For securities law liability reasons, projections may appear in a registration
statement on Form

S-4 but not in a registration statement on Form S-1. There are two
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Aurora might take four different stances towards the potential moral
hazard. If Aurora picks Choice One, it can either tell the public that
deployment might occur when the Safety Proposition is false, or it might
remain silent. Disclosing its true stance towards safety in the case of Choice
One creates a serious public relations risk. If Aurora does not amend the
Aurora S-1 and remains silent, that is a good indication that Aurora is
preserving the option to deploy when it either has no idea about the truth
of the Safety Proposition or it has reason to believe it is false.12 2 This is so
because if Aurora's ethical values and principles allow it to deploy its AV
technology at scale when the Safety Proposition is false or its status
unknown, then its acceptance of this possibility will not conflict with the
financial interests of its investors.
This is a hazard for the public, but not a moral hazard for Aurora's
management in the classic sense; this attitude towards safety will never
conflict with a fiduciary duty to stockholders because preserving an option
for stockholders always has value. It is always better to choose an option
which may not result in the loss of $10 billion by deploying early, than accept
the certain loss of $10 billion resulting from failure to deliver a product on
time.
If Aurora picks Choice Two and adopts the moral principle that it will
not deploy AV technology when the Safety Proposition is false (or when its
truth or falsity is unknown), then it might make express disclosure of its

other alternatives to financial failure. If Aurora can develop its AV technology
sufficiently to demonstrate a "proof of concept," then another industry buyer might
acquire Aurora to obtain its technology, or the proof of concept might be enough to
secure another round of financing. But, as a stand-alone company, Aurora likely fails if
deployment is delayed in any material way. An effort to show proof of concept focuses
on demonstrating functionality and not safety, assuming any accidents during testing
can be paid for and subsequently advertised as "fixed." The cost of a few lives may not
provide an adequate deterrent given the monetary stakes. By comparison, Embark was
demonstrating a proof of concept when it sent a truck on an autonomous journey around
Oakland. See Embark

S-4, supra note 33.

122. One way for Aurora to announce a decision to opt for Choice Two post public
offering, without amending the Aurora S-1 or Reinvent S-4, would be to make a
corporate decision to implement IEEE 7000 and, as part of that implementation decision,
announce a standard for initial deployment. As a new development this decision would
be reported on an SEC Form 8-K-avoiding the appearance that a prior filing contained a
material misstatement or omission that needed correction.
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stringent principle for deployment or it might remain silent. The option to
remain silent having made Choice Two makes no sense if the goal is to build
trust because it is a missed opportunity to create the public trust which
Aurora strives to achieve.
The failure to clearly identify a standard for deployment of AV
technology at scale, coupled with a failure to comply with IEEE 7000, is
corrosive of trust. Indeed, lack of clarity about the deployment standard
and failure to implement IEEE 7000 may conflict with undertakings made
by IEEE members. Among other things, IEEE members agree "to strive to
comply with ethical design," "to avoid real or perceived conflicts of
interest," and "to be honest, and realistic in stating claims or estimates
based on available data."123 IEEE members who serve as officers, directors,
or advisors to AV companies need to justify a failure to implement IEEE
7000, which is designed to fulfill the agreements each member commits to
every year.
III.

THE DIRTY DOZEN MYTHS ABOUT AV TECHNOLOGY

AV testing on public roads poses serious risks to vulnerable road users.
Despite these risks, the AV industry campaigns for favorable regulatory
treatment for both current testing and future general deployment. This
campaign to limit meaningful regulation employs various myths about AVs
which are easily debunked (as demonstrated below). The industry's use of
these myths is inconsistent with the development of trustworthy Al.
The Trustworthy AI Guidelines emphasize the "freedom of the
individual": "[i]n an Al context, freedom of the individual for instance
requires mitigation of (in)direct illegitimate coercion ... deception and
unfair manipulation."1 2 4 The Guidelines also strive to preserve "human
dignity": "[i]n this [AI] context, respect for human dignity entails that all
people are treated with respect due to them as moral subjects, rather than
merely as objects to be sifted, sorted, scored, herded, conditioned or

123. IEEE, IEEE CODE OF ETHICS (2020), https://www.ieee.org/content/dam/ieeeorg/ieee/web/org/about/corporate/ieee-code-of-ethics.pdf.
124. Trustworthy Al Guidelines, supra note 6, at 10.
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manipulated." 12 The Guidelines further emphasize that Al systems should
be developed in a manner that respects human dignity.12 1
Emphasis on the ethical use of Al is commonly focused on direct
concerns, such as dodges that attempt to use human drivers as a moral
crumple zone when deploying unreliable Al features. 12 7 However, indirect
concerns are just as important, such as the legal and regulatory
environment in which the Al technology is developed.
For the purposes of this analysis, an indirect form of coercion, deception,
or manipulation occurs when advocacy and talking points used to shape
the legal environment contain untruths, half-truths, and substantive
omissions. The AV industry has drifted into the realm of propaganda by
use of the dirty dozen myths described (and debunked) below to shape the
legal regime in which AV technology is developed. This provides an
additional reason for the public to withhold trust from the AV industry. At
the level of ordinary ethical intuition, consider the following list of myths
and our analysis to decide whether a person using these myths is worthy of
trust. 128

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. A "moral crumple zone" approach to analysis of an accident is one that employs a
human to absorb moral and legal consequences when machinery malfunctions. See
Madeleine Clare Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction, 5
ENGAGING Sci., TECH., & SoC'Y 40 (2019) (describing how responsibility for an action may
be misattributed to a human actor who had limited control over the behavior of an
automated or autonomous system).
128. One of the authors published an earlier version of this list of myths. Philip
Koopman, Autonomous Vehicle Myths: The Dirty Dozen, EE TIMES (Oct. 22, 2021),
https://www.eetimes. com/autonomous-vehicle-myths-the-dirty-dozen/.
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94 PERCENT OF CRASHES ARE DUE TO HUMAN DRIVER ERROR, SO
AVs WILL BE SAFER.

The informal version of this myth is that humans drive drunk or fall
asleep or text while driving. Therefore, computer drivers will necessarily
be safer than human drivers.
To be sure, many crashes are caused by impaired drivers. However, the
94 percent figure is a misrepresentation of the original source. 129 In fact, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) study data
shows only that in 94 percent of crashes, a human driver might have helped
avoid a bad outcome. That is not the same as causing a crash. Indeed, the
source explicitly disavows placing 94 percent "blame" on the human driver:
The critical reason [generally, the last event in the causal chain
of the crash] was assigned to drivers in an estimated 2,046,000
crashes that comprise 94 percent of the NMVCCS crashes at
the national level. However, in none of these cases was the
assignment intended to blame the driver for causing the

crash. 130
Not only does 94 percent not represent simple driver error, it elides the
fact that AVs will make different kinds of mistakes than human drivers. 131
This myth is particularly troublesome precisely because the 94 percent does
not describe driver error. Wrongly treating that number as representing
driver error downplays the need to watch for AV errors. To be sure, AV
technology will improve over time, but it remains to be seen how long it
will take for AVs to be net safer than human drivers in complex driving
situations after factoring AV's shortcomings into the analysis.

129. See, e.g., Don Kostelec, The 94% Error: We Need to Understand the True Cause of Crashes,

STREETSBLOG USA (Oct. 14, 2020), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2020/10/14/the-94-solutionwe-need-to-understand-the-causes-of-crashes/.
130. SANTOKH SINGH, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REP. NO. DOT HS 812 115,
CRITICAL REASONS FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH
CAUSATION SURVEY 1 (2015),

https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115.
131. One example is a Tesla vehicle mistaking a moon near the horizon for a yellow
traffic signal lamp. See Jay Ramey, Tesla's Full Self Driving System Mistakes the Moon(!) for
Yellow Traffic Light, MSN (July 23, 2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/autos/news/tesla-sfull-self-driving-system-mistakes-the-moon-for-yellow-traffic-light/ar-AAMuszU.
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MYTH #2: YOU CAN HAVE EITHER INNOVATION OR
REGULATION-NOT BOTH.

Car makers and their representatives encourage removal of "regulatory
barriers to AV deployment," and warn that prescriptive requirements of "a
specific approach .. . could stifle innovation."1 12 Industry talking points in
various venues seek to create an expectation that regulation necessarily
impedes innovation.
This is a false dilemma because regulation need not impede
innovation.1 33 One way to avoid impeding innovation is to adopt
regulations which merely require the industry to follow its own design and
operational safety standards rather than setting specific technology-based
regulatory test regimes. For example, regulators could avoid setting
detailed technical requirements for road testing safety themselves, and
instead require conformance to the SAE J3018 standard. 1 4 That standard
helps ensure that the human safety driver is properly qualified and trained.
It also requires that testing be done in a responsible manner, consistent with
good engineering validation and road safety practices. It places no
constraints on the AV technology being tested other than requiring a means
for a trained human test driver to take over immediate control of the test
vehicle to intervene when required to maintain safety.13 5
None of the regulatory standards proposed by NHTSA 13 6 stifle
innovation. Rather, they promote a level playing field so that companies

132. All. for Auto. Innovation, Comment Letter dated April 1, 2021 on Proposed Rule of
the NHTSA Framework for Automated Driving Systems (Dec. 3, 2020),

https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NHTSA-2020-0106-0728.
133. For a discussion of the status of state and local regulation of AV technology, see
Joshua Burd, State Regulation Fosters Autonomous Vehicle Development, THE REGUL. REV.
(Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/10/14/burd-state-regulation-fostersautonomous-vehicle-development/ (noting that state and local regulation often is very
permissive but sometimes this flexibility compromises safety).

134. J3018, supra note 28.
135. Id. SAE J3018 presumes the safety driver will be physically present in the test vehicle
as a matter of scope. Id. It does not prohibit testing with a remote safety driver. Id. In a
standards-based regulatory regime, regulators would ask the industry to expand the
scope of that standard to include any adjustments appropriate to remote safety drivers.

136. The proposed standards are primarily ISO 26262, ISO 21448 and ANSI/UL 4600. See
NHTSA Framework for Automated Driving System Safety, 85 Fed. Reg. 78058, 78065-66
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cannot skimp on safety to gain competitive advantage while putting other
road users at undue risk.
If a company adopts safety as its first priority, as many say they do, there
is no reason to believe that they cannot also comply with a regulatory
mandate to follow industry-consensus safety standards. Such standards are
written and approved by the industry itself via an accredited Standards
Development Organization (SDO) such as SAE International, the
International Standards Organization (ISO), the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI), or Underwriters Laboratories. The SDO process
requires
rigorous review from stakeholders,
including voting
representatives of AV developers.
As a normative matter, the AV industry ought to compete on features
other than safe operation of an AV system-with acceptably safe operation
of an AV system held to a uniformly very high standard, driven by SDOcreated industry standards (as has been the practice in aviation, rail,
chemical processing, and other life critical applications of computer
technology for decades). 137
MYTH #3: THERE ARE ALREADY SUFFICIENTREGULATIONS IN PLACE.

A claim that sufficient regulations are already in place is sometimes
made directly by AV industry participants conducting tests but often takes
the more subtle form of saying that a particular AV industry tester
conforms to all existing regulations. 138

(proposed Dec. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) [hereinafter NHTSA DEC. 3,
2020 ANPRM], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-12-03/pdf/2020-25930.pdf.
137. Competing on the safe operation of an AV system differs in kind from competing on
other safety features, such as performance in crash tests, because these safety features are
add-ons and enhancements, not replacement of a human driver. Historical competition
on safety and so-called "star rating systems" primarily relate to mitigation of crash
consequences on the assumption that there will be an imperfect human driver. The
primary safety argument in favor of an AV is that its computer system will be a better
driver than a human insofar as the AV will not crash in the first place. Those aspects of a
system which replace a human driver, and especially the software aspects of such a
system, ought to be uniformly high and not subject to traditional competition for other
aspects of vehicles.
138. The authors have heard this argument made by AV company advocates in verbal
exchanges that are not formally citable.
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Some states, such as Texas and Arizona, enforce no practical limitations
on AV testing so it is particularly easy to conform to all existing regulations.
Other states, such as Pennsylvania and California, require registration and
some form of reporting. 139 But no state requires adherence to a safety
standard relevant to AVs. The one exception currently is New York City,
which requires conformance to SAE J3018 for public road testing. 140
Thus, regulatory assurance of safety, if any, is little more than taking the
manufacturer's word for it. More is required.
MYTH #4: WE DON'T NEED PROACTIVE AV REGULATION BECAUSE OF EXISTING
REGULATIONS AND PRESSURE FROM LIABILITY EXPOSURE.

The current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)1 41 do not
cover computer-based system safety. They are primarily about testing
headlights, seat belts, air bags, and other basic non-AV vehicle safety
functions. An AV that complies with the FMVSS, while having passed
useful and important tests, is not necessarily acceptably safe (for example,
free of unreasonable risk) for use on roadways even as a conventional
vehicle, let alone as an AV.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
generally operates reactively to bad events. If car companies do not
voluntarily disclose issues, many injury and fatality loss events are typically
required before NHTSA forces action. For example, it took eleven crashes
involving Teslas on "autopilot" colliding with emergency vehicles over 3.5
years to prompt NHTSA action.1 4 2
Safety regulators should think hard about an approach in which
"safety" means requiring insurance to compensate the next of kin after a
fatality, which is the typical requirement imposed by state regulations.
With multi-billion-dollar development war chests, a few million dollars of
payout after a mishap seems scant deterrent to safety shortcuts in the race
to autonomy.

139. See, e.g., Autonomous Vehicles I Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT'L CONF.
OF STATE LEG. (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomousvehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx.
140. N.Y.C., N.Y. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK tit. 34, ch. 4,

§ 4-17 (2021).

141. NHTSA Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571, Subpart B (1971)
(omitting references to computer-based system safety).
142. NHTSA, ODI RESUME: INVESTIGATION PE 21-020 (2021),

https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2021/INOA-PE21020-1893.PDF.
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MYTH #5: EXISTING SAFETY STANDARDS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE BECAUSE
(PICK ONE OR MORE):

"

they are not a perfect fit;

"

no single standard applies to the whole vehicle;

"

they would reduce safety because they prevent the developer
from doing more;

"

they would force the AV to be less safe;

"

they were not written specifically for AVs.

Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment reports (VSSAs) issued by AV
companies commonly assert variations on these themes to argue that
industry standards somehow do not apply to very special, unique AV
technology. For example, the Waymo safety methodology report issued as
a supplement to their VSSA-which lay readers might tend to interpret as
a pro-standard approach-does not actually commit Waymo to following
any relevant AV safety standard. 143 Other VSSA documents simply roll call
standards while making no commitment to adhere to them. 144
These statements misrepresent how actual safety standards work. ISO

26262, ISO 21448, and ANSI/UL 4600 all permit significant flexibility in
support of safety. All three work together to fit any safe AV.
ISO 26262145 ensures safe operation for conventional computer-based
functions. ISO 21448146 deals with the inherent limitations in sensors, and
surprises in an open external environment, by covering so-called Safety of

143. See N. Webb, et al., Waymo's Safety Methodologies and Safety Readiness Determinations

6-9, WAYMO LLC (Oct. 31, 2020), available at Safety Publications, Safety, WAYMO,
https://waymo.com/safety/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (follow "Safety Methodologies"

hyperlink).
144. See, e.g., AURORA, VOLUNTARY SAFETY SELF-ASSESSMENT 12 (2021), available at Aurora
Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment, AURORA, https://aurora.tech/vssa (last visited Mar. 18,

2022) (follow "View Aurora's VSSA" hyperlink).
145. Int'l Org. for Standardization [ISO], ISO 26262-1:2018 Road vehicles - Functional
safety (2018) [hereinafter ISO 26262].
146. ISO, ISO/DIS 21448 Road vehicles - Safety of the intendedfunctionality (undergoing
final revision process prior to issuance).
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The Intended Functionality (SOTIF) for AVs. ANSI/UL 4600147 works with
ISO 21448 and ISO 26262 to cover AV system-level safety, encompassing
the vehicle and its support infrastructure.
The US Department of Transportation (US DOT) has already proposed
this set of standards in an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 18 All
these standards allow developers to do more than required and are flexible
enough to accommodate any AV. None force a company to be less safe (a
truly strained argument to criticize standards largely drafted by industry
participants who might complain about following standards). None
constrain the technical autonomy approach beyond requiring safety.
MYTH #6: LOCAL AND STATE REGULATIONS NEED TO BE STOPPED TO AVOID A
"PATCHWORK" OF REGULATIONS THAT INHIBITS INNOVATION.

The industry and Federal Government frequently bemoan the threat
of a "patchwork of incompatible laws" 149 for AV safety.
A significant reason that local and state regulations are developing as a
"patchwork" approach is that in each jurisdiction, the AV companies play
hardball, negotiating to minimize regulation. The companies threaten that
essentially any fettering of testing with safety regulations will create "one
of the least hospitable cities in the US for AV development," for example,
calling upon regulators to "reject these additional hurdles to New York's
autonomous vehicle future." 150 The typical playbook for the AV industry
(as reflected in off the record remarks by some elected officials) is to
threaten to take jobs and spending elsewhere if there is substantive safety

147. UNDERWRITERS LAB'YS,

ANSI/UL

4600 STANDARD FOR SAFETY FOR THE EVALUATION OF

AUTONOMOUS PRODUCTS (1st ed. 2020).

148. See NHTSA DEC. 3, 2020 ANPRM, supra note 136.
149. See, e.g., ISSUES IN AV TESTING, supra note 2; NHTSA, FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES

POLICY 7 (2016) (noting the objective of a consistent national framework rather than a
patchwork of incompatible laws),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/federalautomated_vehicles_policy.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Gersh Kuntzman, Self-Driving Car Industry, Promising Safety, Pushes Back on
DOT Plan to Regulate Testing, STREETSBLOG NYC (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2021/09/01/self-driving-car-industry-promising-safety-pushesback-on-dot-plan-to-regulate-testing/ (describing an NYC DOT open meeting).
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regulation, as well as threaten the area with a reputation for being hostile
to innovation and technology.
The outcome of each negotiation is different, resulting in somewhat
different regulations or voluntary guidance. In truth, the patchwork is
largely self-inflicted by the AV companies themselves.
Moving to regulation based on industry standards would help the
situation by establishing a level playing field across all states and
municipalities. A federal regulation that prevents states from acting but
does not itself ensure safety would make things worse.
MYTH #7: WE CONFORM TO THE "SPIRIT" OF SOME STANDARD.

Typically, the "spirit" statements made by AV developers rely on the
notion that there might be a need for deviation from the standard.151 Yet a
concrete example of such a need for deviation is never really stated, nor do
the AV developers elaborate in any concrete way what it might mean to
conform to the "spirit"-as opposed to conforming to both the spirit and
the letter of the standard.
The industry promulgated standards are all flexible enough that if a
company conforms to the spirit of the standard in a meaningful way, it can
readily conform to the letter of the standard as well. However, if a company
is in a hurry or wants to cut costs, committing to follow only the spirit might
come in handy as a form of evading any expectation of following industry
safety standards. A better practice would involve consultation with
regulators to either confirm the reasonableness of any required deviation
from a standard or obtain a limited exemption from industry safety

151. The term "spirit" is commonly used by industry participants in verbal discussions
that are not readily citable. However, equivalent sentiments are seen in Waymo's use of
the phrase "informed by ... existing safety standards," WAYMO, WAYMO SAFETY REPORT
11 (2021), https://storage.googleapis.com/waymo-uploads/files/documents/safety/202112-waymo-safety-report.pdf; Uber's statement that it "follow[s] an internal process
informed by the principles of relevant industry standards," UBER ADVANCED TECHS. GRP.,
A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO SAFETY 47 (2020),

https://uber.app.box.com/v/UberATGSafetyReport; and Ford's statement that its
"functional safety process is strongly aligned with the industry automotive safety
standard (ISO 26262)," FORD, A MATTER OF TRUST 2.0, FORD'S APPROACH TO DEVELOPING

SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES 26 (updated June 2021),

https://media.ford.com/content/dam/fordmedia/North%20America/US/2021/06/17/fordsafety-report.pdf.
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standard conformance that is properly structured to preserve safety-if,
indeed, any such need can be established.
Companies that truly value safety should support transparent
conformance to industry consensus standards to raise the bar for
competitors. If they don't, that could provide protective cover for any
potential bad actors to make hollow claims related to standards that
amount to safety theater.
Consider whether a passenger would wish to ride in an autonomous
airplane whose manufacturer said: "We conform to the spirit of the aviation
safety standards, but we're very smart and our airplane is very special, so
we took liberties. We make no concrete claim at all as to standards
conformance and involved no independent safety oversight. Trust us;
everything will be fine."
MYTH #8: GOVERNMENT REGULATORS AREN'T SMART ENOUGHABOUT THE
TECHNOLOGY TO REGULATE IT.

The proposed US DOT plan to invoke industry standards mentioned
above in Myth #5 makes sense because it addresses this concern directly.
Industry has already created relevant safety standards. Regulators can
simply say: "follow your own industry safety standards, just like all the
other safety critical industries do."
If we could trust any industry to self-police safety in the face of shortterm profit incentive and inevitable organizational dysfunction, we
wouldn't need regulators. But that isn't the real world. Achieving a healthy
balance between the industry taking responsibility for safety and oversight
from regulators is important.
MYTH #9: DISCLOSING TESTING DATA GIVES AWAY THE SECRET SAUCE FOR
AUTONOMY.

Road testing safety is all about whether a human safety driver can
effectively keep a test vehicle from creating elevated risk for other road
users. That has nothing to do with autonomy-related intellectual property,
the point of which is to dispense with the human safety driver after testing
has been completed.
Testing safety data need not include anything about the autonomy
design or functional performance. For example, consider reporting how
often test drivers fall asleep while testing. A non-zero result might be
embarrassing (and indicate some level of risk to road users that should be
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mitigated further), but how does that divulge secret autonomy technology
data?
Metrics derived from consistency of conformance to processes in SAE
J3018 should provide a way to measure the effectiveness of road-testing
safety processes. Such an approach would create measurements for drivers
and test protocols, not the underlying technology.
MYTH #10: DELAYING DEPLOYMENT OF AVs IS TANTAMOUNT TO KILLING
PEOPLE.

The safety benefits of AVs are aspirational, promised at some everreceding horizon in the future. 1 1 2 Moreover, there is no real proof to show
that AVs will be substantially safer than human-driven vehicles, especially
when competing with active safety features for human-driven vehicles such
as automated emergency braking. 15 3
Ignoring industry best practices and putting vulnerable road users at
risk today in a bid to maybe, perhaps, someday, eventually avoid future
harm if the technology proves economically viable should not be permitted.
Further, bad press from a high-profile mishap can easily set the whole
industry back. No company should be rolling the safety-shortcut dice to hit
a near-term funding milestone while risking both people's lives and the

152. Elon Musk of Tesla is famous for suggesting that functional and safe autonomy is
imminent, though the dates he predicts for achieving this goal repeatedly get pushed into
the future. See Aarian Marshall, Elon Musk Promises a Really Truly Self-Driving Tesla in

2020, WIRED (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/elon-musk-tesla-fullself-driving-2019-2020-promise/# (noting different times Musk missed target dates for
deployment of AV technology). Cf. Hirsch, supra note 84 (quoting Aurora's Urmson who
urges early deployment of AV technology now, or in the near future, before it has
achieved its promise of zero accidents).
153. See JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A
GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 154 (2016),

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research reports/RR400/RR4432/RAND_RR443-2.pdf (stating that a Tier 1 executive of original equipment
manufacturers saw AV technologies as "comparable to'today's active safety warning
systems"' in safety). The most that can be said is that it seems likely safety will improve:
"AV technology will likely lead to substantial reductions in crashes and the resulting
human toll." Id. at 16. However, even this analysis is subjective and not based on any
data supporting the proposition that safety improvement will be realized within any
defined timeline.
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reputation of the entire industry. And yet, it seems that AV companies are
heavily incentivized to do this very thing.
MYTH #11: WE HAVEN'T KILLED ANYONE, SO THAT MUST MEAN
WE ARE SAFE.

In other words: "we've gotten lucky so far, so we plan to get lucky in
the future." If there is no evidence of robust, systematic safety engineering
and operational safety practices, this amounts to a gambler on a winning
streak claiming they will keep winning forever. This approach appears
particularly ill-considered in light of high-profile fatalities that already have
occurred involving Uber and Tesla.
We should not be giving developers a free pass on safety until more
people are injured or killed. This is especially true for testing practices that
in effect use safety drivers as a moral crumple zone. 1 4
MYTH #12: OTHER STATES/CITIES LET US TEST WITHOUT ANY RESTRICTIONS,
SO YOU SHOULD TOO.

In the 2018 Tempe Arizona Uber ATG fatality a pedestrian was struck
and killed by an AV test vehicle. Initial reports blaming pedestrian behavior
and road lighting conditions were later discredited. While safety driver
inattention contributed to the mishap, the root cause was unsafe testing
practices that manifested as a symptom of a deficient safety culture.155 The
most recent version of SAE J3018 for road testing safety incorporates lessons
learned from that tragic fatality. If testers won't follow that consensus
industry standard, they haven't really taken those lessons to heart.
Regulators should pause to consider the consequences of putting
vulnerable road users at increased risk to benefit for-profit companies.
Those companies are using public roads as an experimental testing ground
in their high-stakes race to autonomy. While road testing brings with it jobs
and prestige for being tech-friendly, even a single testing fatality can draw
worldwide negative attention to a region.

154. See Elish, supra note 127.
155. NAT'L TRANSPORT. SAFETY BD., ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/HAR-19/03, COLLISION
BETWEEN VEHICLE CONTROLLED BY DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM AND
PEDESTRIAN 38 (2019),
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR1903.pdf.
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Regulators charged with ensuring safety should not feel inhibited from
merely asking developers to follow the industry safety standards that in
most cases the companies themselves helped write or had the opportunity
to comment upon. 156 At-risk road users should not be used as unwitting test
subjects for AV testers that, based on their actions, are not truly putting
safety first. The combination of a failure to follow industry standards,
coupled with the promotion of false and questionable narratives, is a
practice that corrodes trust.
IV.

"AUTONOMANDERING" AND THE CHALLENGE FOR THE POLITICAL

PROCESS

This Part describes a practice in the AV industry which we call
"autonomandering." 157
It
bears
a
family
resemblance
to
158
gerrymandering -the
portmanteau combining "autonomous" with
"gerrymandering." Like gerrymandering, autonomandering ought to be
disfavored because it poses challenges for a representative democracy.
Engaging in the practice provides a further reason to withhold trust.
Autonomandering is a practice in which one or more AV companies
lobby members of a state legislature to approve permissive statewide AV
laws and regulations to preempt (and thus avoid) more restrictive, safety
conscious municipal laws tailored for the special circumstances of an urban
environment. It might be used proactively to block future more protective
and thus restrictive municipal laws, as well as displace existing municipal

156. The On-Road Automated Driving (ORAD) SAE committee issued SAE J3016, SAE
J3018, and other AV-relevant standards. The committee roster includes broad industry
participation: https://www.sae.org/servlets/works/roster.do?comtID=TEVAVS
(Registration with committee required for access).
157. We style the name of this practice "autonomandering" after the practice of
"autonowashing" coined by Liza Dixon. See supra note 25. The term "autonowashing"
describes the gap between the presentation of information about partial automated
driving systems by the media and AV marketing teams and the actual system
capabilities. This practice influences public perceptions of vehicle automation causing
overreliance on partial automated driving systems, thus presenting a safety risk.
158. The harmful effects of gerrymandering are well known. "Gerrymandering refers to
the drawing of political boundaries to favor one party, or one faction or another." Elaine
Kamarck, Gerrymanderingand How to Fix It, BROOKINGS (Feb. 2, 2018),

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2018/02/02/gerrymandering-and-how-to-fixit/.
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regulation (such as the protective regulations found in New York City).1 59
The strategy of passing a state law to neuter a local law is ubiquitous across
subject matters, impacting areas of active public debate, such as minimum
wage laws, gun regulations, status as a sanctuary city, and the ride hailing
business. 16 0
Particularly because the ride hailing business figures in the business
plans of AV companies, 16 1 we predict that widespread autonomandering
cannot be far behind. Indeed, since we first posted a version of this article
on SSRN in November of 2021, legislators in Pennsylvania have proposed
a law governing AV testing and deployment which has broad pre-emption
provisions, which would effectively prevent Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
from passing municipal laws appropriate for conditions in their urban
environments. 16 2 The ride hailing business is only likely to be profitable (and
certainly will be most profitable) in urban areas, so urban testing is a
business necessity because it precedes deployment at scale in an urban
environment. Accordingly, the AV industry would like to avoid any
regulatory requirements which might impact or delay testing in urban
environments.

This presents a challenge for the democratic process because the risk
created by AV testing falls disproportionately on urban populations yet it
prevents municipalities from responding to safety concerns expressed by

159. See supra note 15.
160. A website even tracks this practice. Preemption Conflicts Between State and Local
Governments, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Preemptionconflictsbetween_state_and_local_governments (last
visited Mar. 18, 2022). See also Spencer Wagner, Three Strategies to Restore City Rights in an
Era of Preemption, NAT'L LEAGUE CITIES [NLC] (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.nlc.org/article/2019/12/13/three-strategies-to-restore-city-rights-in-an-era-ofpreemption/; SPENCER WAGNER, ET AL., NLC, RESTORING CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF
PREEMPTION (2019), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Restoring-CityRights-in-an-Era-of-PreemptionWeb.pdf (discussing tools and strategies to advance local
decision-making in the face of preemption).
161. See, e.g., Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at 83 (noting that Aurora plans to target the ride

hailing business in 2024).
162. See S.B. 965, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Sess. 2022 § 8510 (Pa. 2022),
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?sYear=2021 &slnd=0&body=S&t
ype=B&bn=965. Legislation has also been introduced in Kansas and Oklahoma.
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their constituents-concerns which may not apply in other areas of a
state. 16 3 IEEE 7000 states that "designers [of an Al system] need to take
particular care that the system design and algorithms do not unjustly favor
or select users in certain geographic areas .... " 1 64 Vulnerable residents of at
least some urban areas did not implicitly consent to a higher risk exposure
than rural residents, as evidenced by the passage of municipal laws more
protective than general laws applicable statewide. 15
Risk imposed upon other road users differs in kind from the risk
exposure assumed by passengers who voluntarily enter an AV. A more
protective municipal law, if enforced, might equalize the relative risk
exposure between urban constituents and rural constituents (where more
permissive testing might occur based on less restrictive laws applicable
statewide). When AV companies engage in autonomandering, we consider
it further evidence that the AV industry does not deserve public trust. 166
Because this legislation has been proposed for Pennsylvania, its passage
(let alone the lobbying effort to achieve pre-emption reflected by
introduction of the bill) has the potential to taint the many AV companies
located in Pittsburgh and elsewhere in Pennsylvania. With appropriate
amendments, however, the bill might evolve into a model which helps
establish Pennsylvania (or, with municipal regulation, Pittsburgh) as the
epicenter for cutting edge technology developed the right way (for
example, by following IEEE 7000 and allowing voices in urban areas to be
heard).
In addition to IEEE 7000's concern that the development of Al systems
avoid creation of geographic discrimination, we think it equally important

163. There are also potential equity issues because pedestrians in low-income urban areas
are more vulnerable to death. See Tanya Snyder, Study: People in Low-Income Areas More

Likely to be Killed While Walking, STREETSBLOG USA (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://usa.streetsblog.org/2014/08/05/study-people-in-low-income-areas-more-likely-to-

be-killed-while-walking/.
164. See IEEE 7000, supra note 5, at 27.
165. See text accompanying note 159 and supra note 15.
166. The video of the press conference appears on Senator Langerholc's webpage in
which certain of the Senator's "legislative partners" are identified.
https://www.senatorlangerholc.com/2022/01/05/langerholc-introduces-legislation-tocreate-a-roadmap-for-highly-automated-vehicles/.
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that the background conditions under which Al testing and deployment
occur respect the democratic process, just as the operation of specific Al
technology ought to do. The Trustworthy AI Guidelines emphasize the
importance of democracy and the rule of law:
A future where democracy, the rule of law and fundamental
rights underpin Al systems and where such systems
continuously improve and defend democratic culture will
also enable an environment where innovation and
responsible competitiveness can thrive. 167
The concern expressed in the Trustworthy AI Guidelines-that Al
development fosters democratic culture-raises the question of how the
process of passing laws and regulations governing AV testing and
deployment is proceeding throughout the United States.
The AV industry often focuses on interaction among federal, state, and
local laws and regulations. The industry hope is that uniform standards
might apply throughout the nation. (Achieving the goal is a step toward a
uniform international standard.) In either case, uniform standards should
foster both innovation and safety. From the AV industry perspective, any
regulatory scheme should include a healthy dose of self-regulation.
The general concern expressed by the AV industry is that the United
States presently has a patchwork of potentially inconsistent laws and
regulations which might impede the rapid development of AV technology
and hinder innovation. 16 1 Currently, the U.S. Congress has not passed any
federal laws specifically regulating AV technology. However, existing
federal laws and regulations might impact testing and deployment-for
example, by requiring the presence of steering wheels1 6 9 (which some AV

167. Trustworthy Al Guidelines, supra note 6, at 9. These guidelines were introduced, in
part, to show "the right way to build a future with Al." Id.
168. See, e.g., Michele Kyrouz, Industry Comments to NHTSA's Federal Automated Vehicles
Policy, MEDIUM (Jan. 13, 2017), https://medium.com/smart-cars-a-podcast-aboutautonomous-vehicles/industry-comments-to-nhtsas-federal-automated-vehicles-policy436e7e24911a; Chris Giarratana, Is the Battle of Autonomous Car Regulations Killing You?,
TRAFFIC SAFETY STORE (Dec. 1, 2016),

https://www.trafficsafetystore.com/blog/autonomous-car-regulations/#.
169. See generally Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles with Automated Driving

Systems, 84 Fed. Reg. 24433 (proposed May 28, 2019),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/28/2019-11032/removing-regulatorybarriers-for-vehicles-with-automated-driving-systems.
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manufacturers would like to eliminate from future products, 170 but which
does not present insurmountable challenges to autonomy technology
development efforts). Also, the FTC regulates advertising of AVs. 171
Moreover, federal regulators might proceed by granting exemptions from
existing law and regulation to allow for limited public highway testing of
certain products.
But as a general matter, the federal government has remained on the
regulatory sidelines. A consensus is emerging that it will take years, if not
a decade, before any meaningful and comprehensive federal legislation will
be enacted, together with adoption of proper supporting interpretive rules
and regulations approved after notice and comment. That is to say, the
federal government is unlikely to take any proactive and forward-looking
approach to AV safety. Rather, the prediction is that federal agencies will
simply react to accidents by launching investigations and mandating data
collection in the near and intermediate term.
Additionally, the current division of responsibility for safety is such that
federal regulations cover automotive equipment, while state regulations
cover the human drivers. Testing that involves human driver oversight
places the vast majority of safety responsibility on the human driver, and
thus should properly be in the realm of state regulation to the degree that
mishaps are attributed to driver error rather than equipment failure. 172
When an automated driver replaces the human driver, this will change the
balance of regulatory input from the states to the federal government if the
automated driving system is treated as automotive equipment rather than
akin to a human driver.

170. See Stephen Loveday, Report: Elon Musk Says $25K Car Coming in 2023, Maybe No
Steering Wheel, INSIDEEVs (Sept. 3, 2021, 9:20 AM),
https://insideevs. com/news/530786/elon-musk-tesla-compact-car-no-steering-wheel/.
171. William H. Widen, Machine Driver Vs. Human Driver in PossibleFTC Action Against

Tesla, JURIST (Aug. 26, 2021, 9:00 AM)
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/08/william-widen-machine-driver-vs-human-

driver-ftc-tesla/.
172. The separation of driver responsibility from equipment failure becomes murky
when considering whether driver monitoring system (DMS) technology is fit for its
purpose. However, if the driver is blamed for a crash, then the basis for the blame clearly
falls within the realm of state regulation.
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Motivated, in part, by the absence of federal leadership, many states
have passed laws regulating AV testing and deployment-some permissive
(such as Arizona, Florida, Nevada and Texas), 173 and others with content
intended to improve safety (such as California). 174 Recently, some local
governments also have passed laws relating to AV testing, a signature
example being New York City. 175 The primary local concern ought to focus
on testing of AV technology (and less with deployment at scale). 176 In order
to have a workable statewide and national transportation system, good
reasons exist for uniform standards once AV technology is ready for
deployment at scale. 177
If, as in the case of New York City, a municipality passes a protective
law imposing material requirements and conditions on the testing of AVs,
an AV company might find such a law inconvenient. This is particularly
true because the AV industry needs to engage in urban testing to capture
the bulk of ride hailing business. How might an AV company remove a
municipal law that makes testing inconvenient, or one that mandates
publication of safety data (and prevent any future municipal regulation)?
The autonomandering strategy might proceed as follows. One or more
AV companies draft a model statute (working together or through an
industry group like PAVE) governing AV testing and deployment which
contains few or no meaningful provisions supporting safety. For show, it
contains some precatory language which, for marketing purposes, can be
defended as safety conscious or safety aware. It might well be dressed up
with an impressive recitation of technical definitions and a roll call of
potential safety practices-but without requiring AV companies to conform
to any of those safety practices.
The AV companies then present the model statute, first in private, to
members of the target state legislature, hoping to drum up support for
passage of a permissive bill. For illustrative purposes, assume the targeted

173. See supra note 13.
174. See supra Section I (discussing California law and regulations as applied to Tesla).
175. See supra note 15.
176. The issue is arguably more complicated when considering the question of whether
an un-crewed test vehicle driving recklessly due to defective software would be a state or
federal regulatory concern.
177. Nonetheless, such standards should preserve state and municipal prerogative to set
local traffic regulations necessitated by local conditions as they do today.
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members of the legislature represent more conservative and pro-business
constituents who live in rural areas. The idea is to prearrange votes for the
model statute. When the votes are lined up, the bill is introduced and placed
on a fast track for enactment. If, through gerrymandering or otherwise, the
targeted legislators command a majority in the state legislature, the model
statute passes quickly, without meaningful hearings or debate.
The equitable problem with such an approach is that it promotes the
interests and wishes of constituents for whom AV testing is a lower safety
concern. Ex hypothesis, the residents of the urban area comprising the city
which passed the municipal regulation have a greater concern over safety
rather than potential economic concerns such as business development. It
is often the case that citizens living in urban areas have a more progressive
attitude toward the value of regulation than citizens living in rural areas. 178
The net effect of autonomandering, should it occur, is that the state
representatives of citizens at lower risk of harm defeat protective municipal
regulation designed to address the specific safety concerns of the urban
residents. This situation occurs if the passage of the model statute at the
state level preempts more protective municipal legislation.
The easy fix for this inequitable situation is for the state legislation to
specifically provide that it is passed in addition to, but not in lieu of, specific
municipal regulation which addresses circumstances of local concernsuch as higher traffic volume, greater road user vulnerability, equity
concerns for road users put at risk, and more challenging situations in city
driving conditions. It is particularly important that any statewide
legislation expressly allow for local variation with respect to the testing of
AV technology. This is the only way to equalize the risk exposure between
urban residents and rural residents. By the time of deployment at scale, AV
technology ought to be sufficiently developed so that urban residents do
not face increased risks due to an immature technology, thus allowing for
uniformity of treatment following deployment after testing.

178. See, e.g., Timothy Callaghan, et al., Rural and Urban Differences in COVID-19
Prevention Behaviors, 37 J. RURAL HEALTH 287 (2021) (noting that rural residents are
significantly less likely to participate in several COVID-19 related preventive health
behaviors); ROBERT BONNIE, ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENV'T POL'Y SOLS., DUKE UNIV.,
UNDERSTANDING RURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION IN

AMERICA 17 (2020) (noting that "[r]ural respondents were much more likely to prefer less
government oversight of environment and conservation issues compared to urban and

suburban voters").
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It is easy to withhold trust from companies that engage in
autonomandering, even though this form of lobbying is commonplace.
Given the many prominent AV companies located in Pennsylvania (such as
Argo Al, Aurora and Locomation Inc.), the entire industry will present
poorly if the proposed Pennsylvania bill goes forward without
amendment-it is not a case of a single rogue actor behaving poorly, but
the concerted effort of a group of prominent AV companies. What
distinguishes AV regulation from other forms of legislation is the presence
of ethical standards for Al development which demand that special respect
be paid to democratic processes. Autonomandering fails to recognize or
respect the ethical values represented by democracy.
V.

PROBLEMS WITH J3016 AS A SAFETY STANDARD AND THE WAY FORWARD

This Part describes shortcomings of SAE J3016 in defining the scope of
laws and regulations covering testing or deployment of AVs (whether
applicable to a particular vehicle type or to a specific driving automation
system or feature). The following discussion makes clear why use of J3016
as part of an AV industry regulatory scheme provides an additional,
systemic reason not to trust that AVs will be tested and deployed safely.
This is particularly true in a legal regime, as in the United States, where the
default rule is that any action which is not prohibited is permitted.
This motivates our suggestion for a shift in approach to determining the
scope of AV regulation towards a model which could better build systemic
trust by creating more certainty of application. We suggest a modified
version of SAE J3018 as a basis for AV testing regulation. 179
A. Issues with 13016 to Define the Scope of a Law or Regulation
SAE J3016 sets forth a taxonomy for motor vehicle automation ranging
from Level 0, representing no automation, to "full" automation at Level 5.
Levels 0, 1, and 2 constitute "lower" levels of automation-respectively, no
automation, driver assistance, and partial automation. Levels 3, 4, and 5
constitute "advanced" levels of automation-respectively, "conditional"
automation, "high" automation, and "full" automation.1 8 0
As of this Article, the SAE has issued four versions of J3016 (in 2014,
2016, 2018 and 2021). Though the length of J3016 has increased from twelve

179. Regulation of testing is more problematic than regulation of deployment. The
NHTSA DEC. 3, 2020 ANPRM, supra note 136, is a workable starting point for regulating
deployed systems.

180. See J3016:2021, supra note 27.
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pages to 41 pages, these revisions, while substantial (including
clarifications, additional definitions, examples, and explanations), preserve
the original SAE J3016:2014 level names, numbers, functional distinctions,
and supporting terms.
Unfortunately, as discussed below, some of the revisions have reduced
certainty over the scope of application of the different levels, rather than
enhancing it. The SAE introduced these obfuscating revisions when it
transitioned the purpose of J3016 from a mere taxonomy to facilitate
technical discussions (as in J3016:2014) to a taxonomy that additionally
might be used to set the scope of laws and regulations governing AV testing
and deployment18 1 (from J3016:2016 and forward). 1 2 Ironically, the original
J3016:2014 might have provided a better basis for regulatory use by
describing levels of driving automation systems and features in more
objective terms because it does not expressly consider design intent.
1. Regulatory Boundaries: Vehicles or Driving Automation
Features?
To date, regulatory efforts tend to rely on SAE J3016 to set a
boundary between lower-level automation technologies that escape special
AV regulation, and those higher levels of automation technology covered
by AV-specific regulations. Regulators typically want to regulate the testing
and deployment of vehicles whereas SAE J3016 technically is intended to
classify levels of individual features provided by a driving automation
system and not levels of vehicles. For example, the California law and

181. SAE went so far as to testify before US Congress in a bid to have the SAE Levels
adopted as the basis for regulations. See Jennifer Shuttleworth, Seeking a Common

Languagefor Vehicle Automation, SAE INT'L (May 24, 2017), http://articles.sae.org/15462/.
182. It appears to one of the authors with legal practice experience that the obfuscating
revisions might have been introduced for the purpose of providing the AV industry with
"flex" in the boundaries of the levels (making the determination of the boundary more

subjective and less objective).
The AV industry might be more comfortable with allowing use of J3016 to define the
scope of laws and regulations applicable to it with flex for a variety of reasons, including
the ability to argue that any violation was unintentional. The additional flex gives any
law or regulation which refers to a revised version of J3016 less force as a "safety
guardrail" constraining the actions of industry participants. Of course, reducing the
efficacy of a law or regulation as a safety guardrail reduces trust, rather than enhancing

it.
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regulations covering AVs focuses on testing and deployment of vehicles
(rather than driving automation features). 18 3
Vehicles deemed to be Levels 0, 1, or 2 escape special regulatory scrutiny
because of their relatively low level of autonomous capability. Vehicles
deemed to be Levels 3, 4, or 5 have higher autonomous capability,
subjecting them to special regulation as AVs (at least in locations where
state or local governments desire some form of enhanced oversight for high
automation levels). An uncertain boundary between high and low levels of
automated driving systems allows AV industry participants to explore, test,
and expand the unregulated space for testing and deployment. Expansion
of the unregulated space tends to reduce safety.184
Uncertainty regarding the scope of law and regulation provides a ready
excuse for non-compliance by an industry participant because a participant
might make a plausible claim that the uncertainty created involuntary noncompliance. As illustration, imposing criminal liability typically requires
scienter, yet uncertainty surrounding the scope of application of a law or
regulation makes proof of scienter more difficult. (Most business actors,
whether natural or artificial persons, are more solicitous about criminal
liability.)
Moreover, the mismatch between J3016's focus on levels of driving
automation features and the regulatory agency's interest in regulating
vehicles (rather than driving automation features) can cause confusion. To
understand how this confusion might develop, consider the complexity of
the J3016 structure itself. When defining the scope of a law or regulation,
complexity is undesirable, particularly if certainty is the goal.

183. For our purposes we informally define the "level" of a vehicle to be the level
associated with the highest-level feature the vehicle is capable of, even if that feature is
only activated a small fraction of the time the vehicle is being operated. This definition

seems consistent with regulatory approaches.
184. Though expansion of unregulated space tends to decrease safety, the AV industry
frequently argues that an expanded unregulated space is necessary for innovation and
faster deployment of valuable technology. The question of whether a boundary is clear as
a legal and administrative matter is separate and distinct from the question of where that
boundary ought to be set as a matter of policy. One could reasonably expect that unclear
boundaries are corrosive to regulatory authority and effectiveness, regardless of where
any boundary might be set.
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Under J3016, a vehicle might employ a driving automation system or
feature at Level 4, intended for use in a limited operational design domain
(ODD). For example, a driving automation system might be designed for
use only on interstate highways in dry weather. As a Level 4 feature, in the
language of J3016, this would be an Automated Driving System (ADS)185
and not merely a driving automation system because it can perform the
complete dynamic driving task (DDT) on a sustained basis. 18 6
Such a feature might contemplate that a driver operates the vehicle
manually, without use of automation, from her house to the on-ramp of the
interstate (segment 1; operated at Level 0), engaging the Level 4 driving
automation system on the interstate (segment 2; operated at Level 4), and
reverting to manual operation to exit the interstate, next continuing on local
streets to the destination (segment 3; operated at Level 0). During the Level
4 segment of the trip, the human driver might read a book or take a nap,
leaving the entire DDT to the driving automation system (making this
system or feature an ADS even though used for only a portion of the
itinerary). 18 7
Testing of such a vehicle ought to be subject to safety regulation as a
Level 4 vehicle, even though use of that driving automation system is
appropriate for only part of a trip, because the vehicle is, nevertheless,
equipped with an operational ADS feature. 188 The risk to others using the
interstate is the same during segment 2 of the trip regardless of the feature's
operational status during segments 1 and 3. The various versions of J3016
specifically contemplate that different trip segments might engage different
levels of driving automation systems such as in this interstate ODD

185. The abbreviation "ADS" stands for "Automated Driving System and applies to
Levels 3, 4 and 5 only. Per J3016, an ADS must support features at SAE Levels 3, 4 or 5.
J3016:2021, supra note 27. The term "driving automation system" is a more generic term
encompassing lower SAE Levels as well. Id. at 6. The lower-level systems perform part of
the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) on a sustained basis whereas the higher-level systems
perform all the DDT on a sustained basis. Id. at 6-7. Only a vehicle limited to Level 0
features is without a driving automation system. Id. at 4. In J3016:2014, the term
"automated driving system" was sometimes used generically before the definition of

ADS was introduced in 2016. J3016:2014, supra note 27.
186. See J3016:2021, supra note 27, at 20, 26 tbl.1, 40.
187. See id. at 8 fig.1.
188. Id. at 8.
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example. 189 However, the public discourse often fails to note that a vehicle
can engage a high level of automation for only a portion of a trip, yet remain
subject to regulation as an AV by virtue of operation at Level 3 or above for
only part of an itinerary. But it is not true that the inability of a vehicle to
always operate at a high level of automation, in all conditions, renders the
vehicle Level 2.
Only a vehicle equipped with Level 5 driving automation features needs
to operate across all ODDs. Even then, an "ADS feature designed by its
manufacturer to be Level 5 would not automatically be demoted to Level 4
simply by virtue of encountering a particular road on which it is unable to
operate the vehicle." 190 Under revised versions of 13016, the level of a
driving automation system or feature corresponds to the manufacturer's
design intent for the production version of the feature. 191 Design intent may
exceed actual "real world" performance. 192
In the interest of clarity, if a law or regulation purports to regulate
vehicles rather than driving automation systems (particularly those that also
are ADS), the law or regulation should also refer to a descriptive schema
focused on vehicles rather than features. Alternately, the law or regulation
should make clear that a vehicle which can operate during any segment of

189. See, e.g., id. § 5.5 n.2, at 32.
190. Id. § 8.2, at 36.
191. Id. J3016:2021 states most clearly the importance of design intent to the
determination of a level. However, prior versions of J3016 have relied on the concept of
design intent to set a level as well. See J3016:2016, supra note 27, at 27 (noting that "[t]he
level assignment rather expresses the design intention for the feature") (emphasis
omitted); J3016:2018, supra note 27, at 30 (stating that "[l]evels are assigned, rather than
measured, and reflect the design intent for the driving automation system feature as defined
by its manufacturer"). The emphasis on design intent to determine level does not appear

in J3016:2014.
192. See, e.g., J3016:2016, supra note 27, at 2 (noting that "'Role' in this context refers to the
expected role of a given primary actor, based on the design of the driving automation
system in question and not necessarily to the actual performance of a given primary
actor.") (emphasis omitted). "Driving" involves three primary actors: the human driver,
the driving automation system and other vehicle systems and components. It is worth
noting that a dangerous AV that drives recklessly might be classified as a Level 4 vehicle
based on design intent, even if a human safety driver is kept constantly busy intervening
to avoid crashes in that vehicle's current technological incarnation.
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a trip using an ADS should be regulated as an "autonomous vehicle," as
defined in the law or regulation.
2. J3016 is Not a Safety Standard But "Something Else"
The SAE has promulgated four versions of J3016: in 2014, 2016, 2018 and
2021. No version purports to be a safety standard per se (in contrast with
SAE J3018 193 for example). The original J3016:2014 was a modest document
of twelve pages, denominated as an "Information Report." An information
report is neither an SAE recommended practice nor a standard. 194 The
original J3016 explained that it was published to "provide[] a foundation
for further standards development activities and a common language for
discussions within the broader 'Automated/Autonomous Vehicle'
community." 195 Importantly, J3016:2014 expressly disclaimed use for legal
purposes: "SAE's levels of driving automation are descriptive rather than
normative and technical rather than legal."1 9 6 It also clarified that its scope
was limited to "provid[ing] a taxonomy describing the full range of levels
of automation in on-road motor vehicles. It also includes operational
definitions for advanced levels of automation and related terms."1 9 7
With the first revision (in 2016), J3016 increased to 30 pages in length,
and its status was upgraded from "Information Report" to "Recommended
Practice." 198 J3016:2016 included two principal types of additions. First, it
included more fulsome operational definitions for the lower levels of
autonomy, which had been omitted from J3016:2014. Second, it added
clarifications through more definitions and examples. With these additions,
the SAE expanded the purpose of J3016:2016, indicating that it now had
potential legal application: "Standardizing levels of driving automation
and supporting terms serves several purposes, including ... [a]nswering
questions of scope when it comes to developing laws, policies, regulations,

193. See J3018, supra note 28.
194. See Standards Development Process, SAE INT'L,
https://www.sae.org/standardsdev/devprocess.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).

195. J3016:2014, supra note 27, at 1.
196. Id. § 3, at 2.
197. Id. at 1.
198. J3016:2016, supra note 27, at 1.
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and standards." 199 Further, J3016:2016 indicated that its revisions should
"[b]e useful across disciplines, including engineering, law, media, public
discourse." 2 00 This same purpose and scope appears in the 2018 and 2021
versions of J3016. 201
Despite the expansion of its purpose to answer questions of scope for
developing laws and regulations, the basic structure of J3016 did not
change. It remains today "descriptive and informative, rather than
normative, and technical rather than legal," 2 02 just as it was in 2014.203 But
the revisions made J3016 less suitable to define the scope of a law or
regulation with any certainty by, among other things, introducing the
concept of "design intent" as one factor in setting a level. 204
The expansion of J3016's purpose to include potential legal application
was done by the mere stroke of a pen without justification based on a
change in its structure or approach. Indeed, for two principal reasons, J3016
is deficient for the purpose of setting the scope of a law or regulation. First,
the revisions to J3016 rely on the subjective notion of "design intent" to give
content to the various automation levels. 205 Yet determining the scope of a
law or regulation with legal certainty requires reference to objective, rather
than subjective, criteria.
Use of an intent standard introduces familiar evidentiary challenges. It
requires development of objective signs to prove subjective facts if it is to
have practical legal force. This is obvious in the case of the intent of a natural
person because we cannot directly inspect the contents of another mind.

199 Id. (emphasis omitted).
200. Id.
201. J3016:2018, supra note 27, at 1; J3016:2021, supra note 27, at 1.
202. J3016:2021, supra note 27, § 4, at 24. The same limitation appears in J3016:2018, supra
note 27, § 4, at 18 and in J3016:2016, supra note 27, § 4, at 17.
203. J3016:2014, supra note 27, § 3, at 2.
204. J3016:2014 uses the term "design intent" in two places, neither of which impact the
setting of a level. Id. at 10.
205. The term "design intent" is not defined within the standard, and no external
reference is provided to assist in defining the term.
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The situation is further complicated, however, because at issue is the intent
of a corporation or other business entity in the AV industry.
Artificial entities only operate through human agents such as
employees, managers, and directors. Does one determine the intent of an
artificial entity by reference to the intent of the design engineers, the
marketing department, upper-level management, or the board of directors
(or some combination which must be weighed and balanced in some yet to
be determined fashion)? And, of course, different natural persons within
the same organization might have different design intents, each of which
might have a claim for attribution to the organization.
Moreover, a law or regulation which simply takes an assertion about
design intent at face value, without some independent confirmatory sign,
is very weak indeed. As a comparison, in contract law the meaning of a
contractual term is determined by reference to objective criteria related to
external signs and usages from the perspective of a reasonable person
(rather than testimony by a party about his or her subjective intent).20 6 Any
other approach would make contracts illusory and render the institution of
contracting of little value for business planning.

-

Second, J3016 now looks first and foremost to the manufacturer (not the
regulator) to assign the automation level-and thus, indirectly, the scope
to a particular driving automation system. When combined with use of
design intent to establish a level, AV companies can, effectively, design
their own regulatory regime. As a general matter, however, interpretation
of a law or regulation is a matter for a court or a regulator, not a private
party.
The judgements of the various AV industry participants might differ in
their respective determinations of scope. AV Company No. 1 might classify
a driving autonomy system as Level 4 (based on its "design intent"-even
if the current, immature incarnation requires constant driver supervision
for safety), while AV Company No. 2 might classify a feature with
substantively identical capabilities as Level 2. Allowing multiple private
parties to set potentially inconsistent standards for the same technology
feature creates confusion, making uniform safety regulation a virtual
impossibility. Moreover, such a system is subject to manipulation by

206. See, e.g., Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119,
1119-20 (2008) (noting that the objective theory of contracts provides that mutual assent
to a contract is determined by reference to external acts and manifestations, not by
evidence of subjective, internal intention).
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industry participants, particularly if there is a business advantage to be
gained by doing so.
When a law or regulation relies on a determination made by a private
party (far from the norm), disaster often follows-for example, the financial
meltdown in 2008 which was due, in no small part, to the incorporation into
law and regulation of securities ratings provided by private rating
agencies. 207 The rating agencies' judgment had been compromised by
financial pressures, which resulted in inappropriately high ratings for
many securities, creating increased risks for investors. Financial pressures
similarly might influence the decision of an AV company (whether
consciously or unconsciously) to set the level of a driving automation
system at Level 2 to evade regulatory oversight.
Nevertheless, following the SAE's invitation to use the revised 2016
version of J3016 to answer questions of scope for laws and regulations, the
California DOT incorporated J3016:2016 into regulations governing testing
and deployment of AVs. And the California legislature recently followed
this approach by incorporating J3016:2021 into the related statute. 2 0 To be
sure, there is nothing wrong with incorporating technical materials into
regulations. This practice has many benefits. Indeed, it is a preferred
method used by the U.S. government in the Code of Federal Regulations to
efficiently promulgate regulations. 2 09 However, incorporation by reference

207. See Randall D. Guynn, The FinancialPanic of 2008 and FinancialRegulatory Reform,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 20, 2010),

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/20/the-financial-panic-of-2008-and-financialregulatory-reform/.

208. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.02 (2021); accord CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 228.02(b)
(2021) (stating that the definition of "autonomous vehicle" meets SAE Levels 3, 4, or 5);

2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 277 (S.B. 500) (West) (2021 portion of 2021-2022 Regular Session
updating § 38750 as of Sept. 23, 2021).
209. Congress authorized incorporation by reference in the Freedom of Information Act
to reduce the volume of material published in the Federal Register and CFR. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a); and Incorporation by Reference, 1 C.F.R. pt. 51. Incorporation by reference raises
many issues which have been discussed elsewhere in the literature. See, e.g., Emily S.
Bremer, Technical Standards Meet Administrative Law: A Teaching Guide on Incorporationby
Reference, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (2019). These issues include whether, and to what extent,
a regulation which refers to a specific version of a technical standard is automatically
updated when the technical standard is updated. Automatic updating raises problems
because the public did not have notice, or a chance to comment upon, the revisions in the
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only succeeds to the extent the materials incorporated prove adequate for
the task. The problem with J3016 is that it has proved neither adequate for
legal purposes nor adequate for engineering, media, and public discourse.
3. The Apparent Failure of J3016 to Provide a Complete Vocabulary
J3016 has proved inadequate for at least some engineering, media, and
public discourse, as evidenced by introduction of the term "Level 2 plus," 210
used by some in AV discourse to characterize various advanced (but
allegedly "low level") automation technologies, including Tesla's FSD. As
noted above, the original J3016:2014 was intended to create "a common
language for discussions within the broader 'Automated/Autonomous
Vehicle' community." 211 The introduction of a seemingly technical term like
"Level 2 plus" into the discourse (if truly needed) reflects a deficiency
within the expressive power of the intended common language. Indeed, the
two most recent versions of J3016 specifically state that it is incorrect to use
qualified or fractional references to a level, such as 2.5 or 4.7: "Qualified or
fractional levels would render the meaning of the levels ambiguous by
removing the clarity otherwise provided by the strict apportionment of
roles between the user and the driving automation system in performance
of the DDT and fallback for a given vehicle." 212
We infer that motivation to introduce the term "Level 2 plus" into the
AV discourse comes from an industry desire to identify advanced
automation technology for discussion purposes without leading to
regulatory oversight that would follow from a feature being classified

newer version of the standard. As the California regulation referred to the 2016 version of
J3016, the presumption is against automatic updating. In contrast, the amendment to §
38750 specifically purports to include updated versions of J3016 after September 23, 2021.
210. See, e.g., Dean Takahashi, Nvidia Launches Drive AutoPilot with Xavier Al Processorsfor
Commercial Use, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 7, 2019, 2:00 PM),
https://venturebeat.com/2019/01/07/nvidia-launches-drive-autopilot-with-xavier-aiprocessors-for-commercial-use/ (noting that "Nvidia announced that its Drive AutoPilot
is the first automated driving system that meets standards for Level 2-plus autonomous
cars"). SAE International itself has even published articles using the designation "Level
2+." See Lindsay Brooke, 'Level 2+': Making Automated Driving Profitable,Mainstream, SAE
INT'L (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.sae.org/news/2020/12/rise-of-sae-level-2.
211. See supra text accompanying note 189.

212. See J3016:2018, supra note 27, at 30 (emphasis omitted); accord J3016:2021, supra note
27, at 37.
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above Level 2 in the SAE taxonomy. The ability to potentially sell advanced
automation technology while still holding the driver responsible for any
crashes likely plays a part as well. 2 3
One industry participant indicated that the idea behind "Level 2 plus"
is to describe an advanced, yet simultaneously low level, automation
technology. (One might wonder whether conjoining the concepts of
"advanced" with "low level" even makes any sense.) The purported basis
for this added distinction is that "Level 2 plus" described "new systems that
add safety and comfort features but always keep the driver in the loop. "214
Keeping the driver in the loop, however, has nothing to do with assignment
of level. And the requirement of a safety driver does not, in and of itself,
result in Level 2 status. The irrelevance of a driver in the loop appears in
J3016:2018 (the applicable SAE document at the time of the errant remarks):
As such, it is incorrect to classify a level 4 design-intended
ADS feature equipped on a test vehicle as level 2 simply
because on-road testing requires a test driver to supervise the
feature while engaged, and to intervene if necessary to
maintain safe operation.25
The SAE taxonomy does not make these fine gradations within a level.
Use of a term like "Level 3 minus," for example, would not offer the same
cosmetic effect to avoid the scope of regulation. What makes a technology
Level 2 plus rather than Level 3 minus? If determination of level is based
on the respective roles of human driver and driving automation system,
intermediate or fractional gradations should not be necessary.
Use of the term "Level 2 plus" is perhaps intended to describe an
unregulated zone between Level 2 and Level 3. A concrete example of an
otherwise reasonable use of the term "Level 2 plus" might be to describe a
Level 2 feature that includes both ODD enforcement (that the feature will
engage only within its intended ODD) and an effective driver monitoring
system-neither of which are required to qualify as a Level 2 feature, but
both of which would substantively contribute to safety. Yet the taxonomy's

213. For a description of the practice of holding the driver responsible for crashes as a
kind of "moral crumple zone" see Elish, supra note 127.
214. See Brooke, supra note 210.
215. J3016:2018, supra note 27, § 8.2, at 30. J3016:2021 contains the same observation in its
version of § 8.2. J3016:2021, supra note 27, at 36.
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stated goal is to avoid gaps of this sort. 216 Thus, there simply is no place for
an additional "Level 2 plus" in the current J3016 scheme.
An additional concern with J3016 is that it excludes from its scope
crucial aspects of practical safety for automated vehicles. The emphasis on
J3016 is driving the vehicle; it excludes strategic aspects of vehicle operation
such as route selection.217 Further, J3016 does not address other critical
aspects of vehicle safety for which a human driver would assume
responsibility, but which go beyond the actual task of controlling vehicle
motion. These include: post-crash scene responsibilities, ensuring underage passenger safety, ensuring cargo safety, and ensuring the integrity of
consumables (for example, tire tread depth, windscreen condition, vehicle
lighting system operability), which are all important safety considerations
that must be dealt with even in a vehicle that has no human driver.21 8
Additionally, J3016 has proved inadequate for legal purposes because
of a mix of potentially bright line rules with seemingly flexible standards,
requiring the exercise of judgment for application. 219 J3016 generally assigns
levels based on a manufacturer's design intent (a non-obvious fact rather
than an objective measure) and appears to cede assignment of level to the
manufacturer itself.220 When incorporated by reference into a law or
regulation, however, reference to a subjective measure (such as intent) or a

216. For example, J3016:2016 states that the levels, definitions and terms "can be used to
describe the full range of driving automationfeatures equipped on motor vehicles in a
functionally consistent and coherent manner," indicating by use of the word "full" that
J3016's taxonomy was intended to be complete, without gaps. J3016:2016, supra note 27,

at 2 (emphasis supplied).
217. J3016:2018, supra note 27, § 8.11, at 34.
218. The ANSI/UL 4600 system safety standard covers these types of considerations,
especially in § 14 on lifecycle concerns.
219. For example, the subjective judgement of individual manufacturers as to assignment
of levels creates potential for problematic inconsistencies. For a description of the
difference between rules and standards, see Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 379 (1985). The law governing the standard of conduct for a driver who comes to
an unguarded railroad crossing illustrates the difference. Id. at 379. Oliver Wendell
Holmes suggested a bright line rule: The driver must stop and look. Id. Benjamin
Cardozo offered a flexible standard requiring the exercise of judgment: The driver must
act with reasonable caution. Id.

220. J3016:2021, supra note 27, §5, at 30.
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flexible standard (allowing the manufacturer to determine level which may
vary by company) proves extremely problematic as a systemic matter
because they impede legal certainty. The interpretation of the meaning and
scope of J3016 ought to be transferred to the realm of the courts and the
regulators following incorporation by reference. Typically, a regulator
cannot delegate its responsibility of regulatory oversight to a private party.
Moreover, the tests for satisfying an autonomy capability level are
specified by a mix of textual verbal definitions, summary charts, and
examples, which include apparent gaps and inconsistencies.2 2 1 The net
result is that, in application, J3016 in its various iterations is both subject to
manipulation by AV industry participants and confusing to lawmakers,
regulators, and the public.
Shortcomings in J3016's structure in the original J3016:2014 has been
exacerbated
by subsequent revisions. However, a problematic
organizational structure did not matter for J3016:2014 because the original
version expressly disclaimed any legal application. This changed with
J3016:2016 and beyond (with each subsequent version claiming
applicability for legal use). The intended use changed but the revisions
introduced problematic standards applicable to setting automation levelsthe subsequent versions increased in length and added additional
subjective measures, creating more uncertainty.
B. An Illustrationfrom the History of13016
Examining the history of the specification of low levels of automation in
the different versions of J3016 illustrates the attempt to provide certaintyshowing where it succeeded and where it failed. J3016:2014 contains
potential bright line tests for Levels 0, 1, and 2. Despite the assertion that
J3016:2014 contains functional definitions for only high automation

221. As examples, the specification of minimum standards to qualify for a level is not
complimented by a specification of maximum capabilities that an ADS may have while
remaining at a given level. It is unclear when a transient change in an operating
environment represents an "ODD exit." J3016:2021, supra note 27, at 17. The line between
sustained performance of part or all of the DDT and something other than sustained
performance is unclear. And systems that provide momentary intervention in lateral
and/or longitudinal motion control but do not perform any part of the DDT on a
sustained basis (such as electronic stability control) are not classifiable (other than at
Level 0) under the taxonomy. Id. at 20.
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levels, 222 it in fact outlines functional definitions for low automation levels
as well. These functional definitions receive clarification in later versions.
In J3016:2014, Table 2 describes the ability of the vehicle for Level 0 (No
Automation) as follows: "No active automation (but may provide
warnings)." 22 3 Table 2 describes Level 1 (Driver Assistance) as allowing the
vehicle to execute portions of the dynamic driving task but limited to
control of either longitudinal (accelerating, braking) or lateral (steering)
motion, not both.224 In Level 2 (Partial Automation), the vehicle executes
both longitudinal and lateral aspects of the dynamic driving task when
activated. 22 In both Level 1 and Level 2, the driver assistance/partial
automation deactivates immediately upon request by the human driver.
A key difference between low automation (Levels 0, 1, and 2) and high
automation (Levels 3, 4, and 5) is that in low automation, the human driver
monitors the driving environment, whereas in high automation, the
automated driving system monitors the driving environment when
activated. 22 6 Even within J3016:2014 considered in isolation (before
introduction of "design intent" to define levels) there are a few ambiguities
of scope. Table 1 indicates that a Level 0 vehicle might "intervene" in
addition to providing a mere warning, whereas Table 2 characterized Level
0 as merely providing warnings.227 While Table 1 specifies that in Levels 1
and 2 the human driver "monitors" the driving environment, it also
indicates that the vehicle's driving automation system 228 uses "information"
about the driving environment-suggesting that a Level 1 or 2 vehicle
monitors some aspects of the driving environment, which the human driver

222. J3016:2014, supra note 27, at 1.
223. Id. at 3 tbl. 2.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 3-4 tbl 2.
227. Id. at 2 tbl. 1; Id. at 3 tbl.2. J3016:2014 § 7.1 makes clear that "certain automatic
emergency intervention systems" might be included and still allow a vehicle to be low
automation. Id. at 9.
228. A "driving automation system" refers to any level 1-5 system or feature that
performs all or part of the DDT on a sustained basis. Id. at 3-4 tbl 2. In contrast, the term
"automated driving system" or "ADS" applies only to levels 3-5. Id. at 2 tbl. 1.
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also monitors. J3016:2014 defines "monitor" as consisting of "activities
and/or automated routines that accomplish comprehensive object and
event detection, recognition, classification, and response preparation, as
needed to competently perform the dynamic driving task." 22 9
This definition makes clear that a low automation system is not engaged
in monitoring (as defined) when it detects and processes limited
information about the driving environment to control lateral vehicle motion
and longitudinal vehicle motion, because monitoring requires a
comprehensive assessment of the driving environment. Significantly,
J3016:2014 uses the concepts of lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion only
to make distinctions among low automation levels, not high automation
levels. 230

What changed with the revisions in J3016:2016? One purpose for the
revisions was to clarify and rationalize the "taxonomical differentiator(s)
for lower levels (levels 0-2)."231 This required, among other things, an
enhanced explanation of the type of information a low driving automation
feature collects and processes for lateral and longitudinal motion and was
achieved by indicating a standard that falls short of comprehensive
monitoring of the driving environment.
Thus, J3016:2016 includes definitions for lateral and longitudinal
motion: "Lateral vehicle motion control includes the detection of the vehicle
positioning relative to lane boundaries and application of steering and/or
differential braking inputs to maintain appropriate lateral positioning." 2 32
"Longitudinalvehicle motion control includes maintaining set speed as well as
detecting a preceding vehicle in the path of the subject vehicle, maintaining
an appropriate gap to the preceding vehicle and applying propulsion or
braking inputs to cause the vehicle to maintain that speed or gap." 2 3 3
Notice that J3016:2016 limits the scope of lateral and longitudinal vehicle
motion control with respect to the elements of the driving environment

229. See J3016:2014, supra note 27, § 4.7, at 6.
230. Id. § 5, at 7.
231. J3016:2016, supra note 27, at 2.
232. Id. § 3.10, at 8.
233. Id. § 3.11, at 8 (certain emphasis omitted).
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needed to execute the task. Lateral control consists of identifying lane
boundaries to keep the vehicle in its lane. Longitudinal control consists of
detecting a preceding vehicle in the path of the subject vehicle and
maintaining an appropriate gap for a set speed. As defined, it does not
explicitly include other aspects of the dynamic driving task, such as
detecting stop signs and avoiding pedestrians, nor does it encompass
detecting and avoiding collisions with cross traffic at intersections.23 4
Further, even the concept of executing turns has been removed from later
versions of J3016. 231
Moreover, the combination of lateral and longitudinal control in a Level
2 driving automation feature does not appear to cover the execution of a
lane change. 236 J3016:2016 captures this limited role by expanding the
description of the dynamic driving task and introducing the abbreviation
"OEDR" to refer to object and event detection and response. 237 A Level 2
vehicle only performs "limited OEDR associated with vehicle motion
control." 238 Levels 3, 4, and 5, on the other hand, include "complete OEDR"
because they perform the complete dynamic driving task when engaged in
the applicable operational design domain.2 39
J3016:2016 also clarified the scope of intervention permitted for a vehicle
to remain classified as Level 0.
Active safety systems, such as electronic stability control and
automated emergency braking, and certain types of driver

234. An ambiguity arises because the elements are intended to specify a minimum for a
level, and not a maximum. See infra text accompanying note 232. For example, a vehicle
that can handle 99.99% of the OEDR requirements with a driver completing the last
0.01% is still a Level 2 system, the same as a vehicle that is only capable of keeping itself
centered in a highway lane at constant speed while only being able to follow a leading
vehicle.
235. Indeed, the word "intersection" and even the concept of performing a turn does not
appear in J3016:2016 or later versions at all, even though "turning" was within scope of

the DDT in J3016:2014 § 4.4. See J3016:2014, supra note 27, § 4.4.
236. J3016:2014 made a distinction in its definition of Dynamic Driving Task between
"lane keeping" and "lane changing." See id. at 6.

237. J3016:2016, supra note 27, at 5.
238. Id. at 6.
239. Id.
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assistance systems, such as lane keeping assistance, are
excluded from the scope of this driving automation taxonomy
because they do not perform part or all of the DDT on a
sustained basis and, rather, merely provide momentary
intervention during potentially hazardous situations. Due to
the momentary nature of the actions of active safety systems,
their intervention does not change or eliminate the role of the
driver in performing part or all of the DDT, and thus are not
considered to be driving automation.240
Thus, momentary control of lateral or longitudinal motion in an
emergency (as opposed to control on a sustained basis) is merely an "active
safety system" that is not considered to be "driving automation," even
though there may be an element of "active control of a vehicle subsystem
(such as brakes, throttle, suspension, etc.)." 241 Examples of momentary
control include anti-lock brake systems, electronic stability control and
automated emergency braking. 242 An exception to the requirement of
momentary control is conventional cruise control, which is not momentary.
However, conventional cruise control only maintains vehicle speed based
on the vehicle's internal instrumentation rather than responding to external
events in the driving environment, and thus, is classified as Level 0.243
The foregoing analysis suggests that Levels 0, 1, and 2 might be specified
by objective standards and measures without reference to design intent or
determination of level by a manufacturer. For example, Level 0 features
provide warnings, not control of vehicle motion (with a limited exception
for temporary motion control in an emergency). Levels 1 and 2 depend on
whether an automated driving feature controls both lateral and
longitudinal motion (or only one), using limited environmental inputs such
as identification of highway lines and immediately preceding vehicles.
Evaluation of these limited inputs is not monitoring the complete driving
environment, but only a portion of it.
Conventional cruise control is not an automation feature because it does
not respond to changes in the driving environment. Active safety systems

240. Id. at 2.
241. Id. at 3.
242. Id. at 13.
243. Id.
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such as electronic stability control and automated emergency braking do
not constitute a driving automation feature because they do not perform
part or all the DDT on a sustained basis.
One might simply and objectively define the scope of a law or regulation
by stating that any driving automation system or features in addition to the
above are subject to regulation. The problem arises because under J3016
these "[e]lements indicate minimum rather than maximum capabilities for
each level." 244 The subjective and uncertain elements of design intent and
manufacturer specification creep into J3016 because J3016 fails to specify a
maximum capability for each level, leaving that determination outside the
elements specified in the four corners of the document. Without a
specification of the maximum degree of autonomy capability that a Level 2
driving automation system might possess while remaining Level 2, the
scope of application of a law or regulation will remain uncertain.
A driving automation system might attempt technical compliance to
remain Level 2 by simply omitting some small aspect of the Level 3
specification by failing to monitor an obscure aspect of the driving
environment. For example, an otherwise Level 3 system that cannot
respond properly to an elephant walking on city streets, but intentionally
considers circus parades within its ODD, might be claimed to be Level 2
because the "design intent" is to intentionally not detect elephants,
rendering its OEDR response incomplete and therefore Level 2. This could
be true even if it is solely operating in a geographical area in which a circus
parade from the train station to a local tenting site is purely a theoretical
event which has never actually happened and probably never will. This
same technique might be used to maintain a lower level in other scenarios.
Lastly, the way that SAE has revised J3016 creates additional problems
for use of J3016 across time. The SAE has denoted each revision with the
letter "R" before the document name. Use of the "R" designation indicates
that the document is a "complete" revision. A complete revision does not
need to indicate substantive changes by the use of bars (" I") in the margin.
However, despite the "R" designation, none of the revisions is a complete
revision but rather a refinement or clarification. The failure to properly and
completely identify those changes intended as a change of substance (as
opposed to a clarification) makes use of the current publication take place

244. J3016:2021, supra note 27, at 24.
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in the absence of any meaningful "legislative history." This circumstance
leads to further confusion.
For all the foregoing reasons, J3016 falls short for use in specifying the
scope of laws or regulations. The very structure of J3016 makes a regulatory
scheme which incorporates it by reference uncertain in scope and
untrustworthy in application. To get a better fit using objective rather than
subjective factors, the focus on specification of scope should shift to an
actual safety standard like J3018, with appropriate adjustment to delete the
problematic reference to J3016. We now turn our focus to that exercise.

C. The Way Forward
1. Differentiating Testing from Production
As a practical matter, a significant problem with the application of J3016
to regulation is the conflation of AV testing with end-user operations. This
allows a party to game the levels by manipulating declared "design intent"
to suit marketing or regulatory goals.
Especially problematic is conflation of a Level 2 production vehicle with
a Level 3, 4 or 5 human-supervised developmental test platform. These are
superficially similar in that both have a human driver who is responsible
for intervening if the system is unable to drive properly.2 4 5 However, at a
more nuanced level, the safety implications differ dramatically. An issue
we call the "Level 2 loophole" is exploited when a manufacturer operating
or selling access to what are really Level 3-5 test vehicles claims that they
are only Level 2 vehicles, evading regulatory oversight applied to Level 35 technology.
We address the situation by categorizing technology for regulatory
purposes independent from the SAE Levels. But to get there, we first cover
differentiations that should be made between production Level 2 vehicles
and higher-level test platforms, since the SAE Levels are the starting point
for current regulatory approaches.

245. Human supervision is required in a Level 2 vehicle because it does not perform the
entire dynamic driving task. Human supervision is used in a test vehicle to provide an
extra layer of safety. See J3018.
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2. Production Level 2 Regulation
With a production Level 2 system, a driver is not expected to control
vehicle motion, but must watch for objects and situations the vehicle is not
able to handle properly. 24 6 The driver intervenes if the vehicle is not able to
detect an object or event, is unable to mount a safe response, or to recover
the situation in case of vehicle equipment failure. 2 4 7
Because J3016 is not a safety standard, it does not elaborate on the
implications of the Level 2 approach regarding safety. More aggressive
interpretations of J3016 treat any vehicle in which a driver is put in a driver
seat as Level 2, which can lead to unreasonable risk in practice. To address
safety, we propose that the following attributes be used to characterize a
production Level 2 system for regulatory purposes:
1. Vehicle automation is capable of both lateral and longitudinal
control, but not capable of executing turns at intersections, 24 8
2. Any licensed driver should be able to operate a vehicle with net
combined vehicle-plus-driver safety at least as good as for Level 0

246. See supra note 239 (differentiating function of a human driver in a Level 2 vehicle
compared with a higher-level vehicle).
247. More technically, the human driver completes the Object and Event Detection and
Response (OEDR) sub-task of driving, additionally performing in the role of Fallback
driver if an equipment failure or exit from the ODD occurs.
248. This amounts to characterizing Level 2 as a super-smart cruise control that can
perform both speed control and lane keeping, stopping for objects it is able to detect.
Automated control of both lateral (steering) and longitudinal (speed) vehicle motion
portions of the DDT is the basic definition of Level 2 automation. J3016:2016, supra note

27, tbl. 1. J3016:2014 § 4.4. included "steering, turning, lane keeping, and lane changing"
as part of the DDT. J3016:2014, supra note 27, § 4.4. However, J3016:2016 omits "turning"
from the DDT description and does not refer to vehicle turns anywhere; moreover,
complex maneuvering involving intersections is only referred to in the context of higher
automation levels. We interpret this removal to indicate that J3016:2016 narrows the
scope of lateral movement to intentionally exclude handling intersections as would be
required for urban driving, which is clearly intended to be in scope for higher levels of
automation. Later versions of J3016 similarly do not re-introduce turning into the scope

of the Level 2-relevant DDT definition. See J3016:2018, supra note 27; J3016:2021, supra
note 27.
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and Level 1 vehicles with no special driver training (beyond cursory
vehicle feature familiarization), 249
3. Any safety-relevant vehicle behavior issue should consist of an
automation error of omission by the vehicle automation system
rather than an error of commission, 2 0 and
4. Any safety-relevant vehicle behavior should be readily mitigated
by driver intervention via conventional vehicle controls, namely:
exerting force on the steering wheel or depressing the brake pedal.25 1
The presumption would be that an ordinary driver with no special driving
training would be able to handle a Level 2 system safely. Cursory
familiarization with vehicle controls would be expected so the driver
understands which features are available and how to activate them. But for
a Level 2 system, specialized driving skills should not be required, nor
should training in how to manage faults beyond resuming normal driving
or otherwise overriding features naturally.25 2

249. Consider, for example, the orientation that would be provided to a rental car user
picking up a car at a busy airport rental lot who is running late. Credit for safety cannot
be taken for any optional training that in practice is likely to be skipped in such
situations, or for other reasonably foreseeable misuse regarding training requirements.
250. Errors of omission are a failure to perform some action when action should be taken,
whereas errors of commission are taking an incorrect action. An example error of
omission is not detecting an in-lane obstacle, whereas an example error of commission
would be suddenly veering across the road centerline. This is consistent with the J3016
characterization of Level 2 having an incomplete OEDR rather than a defective OEDR
capability. See J3016:2021, supra note 27, § 5.3 n., at 31. Some errors of omission might still
be deemed unacceptable as a practical matter because the make the vehicle prone to
crashes in excess of Level 0 and Level 1 mishap rates.
251. A "big red button" shutdown switch might be provided as an extra measure of
safety, but safety must not rest on drivers being able to perform control actions that are
not already natural responses in a conventional vehicle. This is no different than the
safety approach taken to cruise control override capabilities, except also involving
steering wheel takeover.
252. Examples of a natural process for overriding features would be an extrapolation of
ordinary cruise control interfaces. If the human driver activates the brakes or exerts
steering control, the automation features should get out of the way and let the driver take
control while unambiguously annunciating to the driver that control has been ceded and
the automation feature has been deactivated.
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A Level 2 driver would be expected to understand performance
limitations as part of the familiarization. Examples of performance
limitations that might be deemed reasonable could include: gradually
drifting out of lane if lane marking paint is highly degraded, failing to
detect a problematic obstacle such as a haze-gray colored truck on a hill
crest against a cloudy sky, attempting to drive into flood waters, or other
situations in which the driver would reasonably expect the system to
struggle in accordance with reasonable lay-person understanding of
technical limitations of the feature. 2 3 Any such limitation should be
communicated clearly and unambiguously to the driver as part of vehicle
orientation. Automation limitations should also be consistent so that the
driver can readily grasp the practical considerations of the limitations and
avoid building false trust. 25 4
A significant safety concern for a Level 2 system is driver "dropout";
that is, a driver paying insufficient attention to the road while not having
any continuous control role in the DDT. 2 11 Dropout can range from
unintentionally falling asleep, to becoming distracted by personal
electronics devices, to daydreaming, and more. These are normal and

253. In practice applying this standard seems likely to require human subject
experiments. Rather than being a disadvantage, this approach simply highlights the
fundamental challenge of any Level 2 system-drivers must be good at knowing when to
intervene based on their internal, subjective mental model of expectations of automation
behavior. If ordinary drivers cannot build and administer a viable mental model of that
type, the vehicle is unlikely to be safe in practice.
254. Arguably a vehicle that detects and avoids impact with 999 out of 1000 police
vehicles when passing a police traffic stop scene is more dangerous than a vehicle that
never detects such a situation. The driver of the 99.9% accurate vehicle will likely build a
false expectation of perfection and not know to intervene when the thousandth police
vehicle that protrudes into a travel lane is missed, potentially resulting in a crash. On the
other hand, the driver of a vehicle that never detects a traffic stop will know that
intervention is required every time because that situation is outside of the vehicle ODD.
Whether either type of system can be designed in a way that is acceptably safe in
practical use is a different question that involves DMS effectiveness as well as other
issues and is beyond the scope of this article.
255. The driver drop-out phenomenon, otherwise referred to as "automation
complacency" is a recurring theme in Tesla crashes and contributed to the Uber ATG
testing fatality. See Letter from Robert L. Sumwalt, III, Chairman, Nat'l Transp. Safety

Bd., Responding to NHTSA DEC. 3, 2020 ANPRM (Feb. 1, 2021) [hereinafter NTSB
Response], https://downloads.regulations.gov/NHTSA-2020-0106-0617/attachment_1.pdf.
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expected reactions by humans asked to perform an extremely boring
supervision task.2 6 Exhorting the driver to pay attention is an ineffective
mitigation strategy for driver dropout. Rather, a driver monitoring system
(DMS) is required to ensure that the driver pays sufficient attention to
operate the vehicle safely.257
An effective DMS would need to have adequate safeguards to prevent
reasonably foreseeable misuse, such as: exiting the driver seat while the
vehicle is in motion; use of readily obtainable DMS defeat devices; a driver
intentionally sleeping during a long commuting trip; and intentional
operation outside the ODD, such as attempting to activate a highway-only
feature on local roads or city streets.2 8
A safer approach to deploying a Level 2 system than just deploying the
bare minimum required by SAE J3016 259 would be to require an effective
driver monitoring system (DMS), and require enforcement of aspects of the
ODD which, when violated, result in reasonably predictable misuse. Both
DMS use and ODD enforcement are optional in J3016. 260 However, both are

256. It is not our intention do condone such misuse, but rather simply to point out that
misuse or other failure to adequately supervise Level 2 features is inevitable due to
human nature and must be accounted for in system design to achieve a level of net safety
better than that for a Level 0 or Level 1 feature.
257. See NTSB Response, supra note 255, at 6-7.
258. These types of misuse have been documented and tend to be featured in online
videos. An especially egregious example is a Tesla owner who was arrested for sitting in
the back seat and publicly pledging to continue the misuse. See Simon Alvarez, Tesla
Owner Arrested Due to Autopilot Abuse Pledges to Continue Autopilot Abuse, TESLARATI (May
12, 2021), https://www.teslarati.com/tesla-autopilot-abuser-continues-illegal-ap-use/.
259. Many, including the authors, believe that a bare minimum J3016 Level 2 system is
inherently unsafe for at-scale deployment on public roads. Recall that J3016 does not
purport to be a safety standard and makes no claims as to whether the defined levels
might be safe. Whether a "higher functioning" Level 2 system might be deployment
ready is an open question-but this very situation illustrates why J3016 is unsuitable for

setting regulatory requirements.
260. See, e.g., NTSB Response, supra note 255, at 7 (noting that NTSB recommended that
NHTSA work with SAE to develop these standards).
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useful to ensure acceptable safety, with an effective DMS, in particular,
being widely agreed upon as a firm requirement. 26 1
Any regulation that invokes SAE Level 2 should additionally require
both a robust, effective DMS, and sufficient automatic ODD enforcement to
deter reasonably foreseeable misuse that results in an unreasonable risk to
safety.
What a driver of an acceptably safe Level 2 system would not expect to
have to do is compensate for a design defect with perfect accuracy. Concrete
definition of what might be a design defect in a system with incomplete
OEDR capabilities can be slippery, and subject to manipulation by AV
makers who might exploit unclear boundaries within J3016 to shift blame
to drivers to use them as a moral crumple zone. 262
However, some types of behaviors seem clearly unreasonable for even
a Level 2 system and should be considered defects in a production system.
These include: 263
"

Sudden vehicle movements that present a substantially
increased risk of a crash. Examples of particularly hazardous
movements would be a sudden attempt to cross the centerline in
two-way traffic, a sudden turn toward a precipice, a sudden
lateral movement toward an adjacent same-direction vehicle, and
unprovoked panic stops that present risk of rear-end collisions by
trailing heavy vehicles. There is a finite reaction time for any
human monitoring automation, no matter how alert, and no
human is perfect at reacting to unexpected vehicle misbehavior.26 4

261. See, e.g., NTSB Response, supra note 255.
262. See Elish, supra note 127 (describing how responsibility for an action may be
misattributed to a human actor who had limited control over the behavior of an
automated or autonomous system).
263. For a compilation of risky FSD behavior (regardless of what SAE level applies), see

TR (@TweetRemoved), Thread, TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2021 and following),
https://twitter.com/TweetRemoved/status/1460999178939678724.
264. Reaction times for the full demographic range of licensed drivers must be
accommodated in vehicles sold to the general public. Reaction times lengthen with age,
stress, and reduced attention. Additionally, reaction time to recognize an automation
failure and then respond will be longer than for reacting to a vehicle equipment failure
when a human driver is in constant control. See NTSB response, supra note 255, at 6.
Driver responsibilities should account for well understood limitations of human
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If the vehicle misbehaves in a way that results in a mishap before
a human can reasonably react or takes an action that a human
cannot reasonably be expected to mitigate using normal driving
controls, that is a system design flaw, not driver error.
"

DMS systems that are ineffective at driver monitoring should be
considered defective. Ineffective DMS can be expected to yield
driver mental states that contribute to delayed, incorrect, or
missing responses to encountering OEDR gaps in the automation
system. Humans have imperfect responses to emergencies, with
the probability of an unsafe response rising dramatically for
highly threatening situations that require very short reaction
times.26 5 Every time the system misbehaves is another chance for
the human driver to react incorrectly, and it is unfair for humans
to be blamed for being imperfect. 266

"

Incorrect OEDR performance (errors of commission) violate the
definition of SAE Level 2, which states that the driver completed
the OEDR rather than being responsible for compensating for
other-than-omissive OEDR failures: "A level 2 driving
automation feature is capable of only limited OEDR, meaning that
there are some events that the driving automation system is not
capable of recognizing or responding to. Therefore, the driver
supervises the driving automation system performance by
completing the OEDR subtask of the DDT." 2 67

"

Erratic OEDR performance that causes a mishap due to violating
an ordinary driver's mental model of what the automation should
and should not be capable of in a way that will reasonably

performance. See, e.g., Mark A. Staal, Stress, Cognition, and Human Performance:A

LiteratureReview and Conceptual Framework, NASA/TM 2004-212824, (Aug. 2004),
https://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/flightcognition/Publications/IH_054_Staal.pdf.
265. See Staal, supra note 264.
266. It is important to consider typical failure rates for human intervention across the
entire licensed driver demographic, accounting for both automation complacency effects
not mitigated by DMS as well as poor human reaction response to sudden, highconsequence events for which drivers do not undergo continual refresher training as is
the case with commercial aviation pilots.

267. J3016:2016, supra note 27, § 5.3 Note, at 23 (emphasis omitted).
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contribute to the occurrence of a loss event. Humans easily fall
into automation complacency, and, in general, tend to trust
systems more quickly than they should. 28 An automation system
that works almost all the time will be trusted by the human to in
practice work all the time, reducing and delaying the capability of
the human driver to realize that an OEDR failure is occurring and
react to it.
Overall, if a Level 2 system is net less safe than a comparably equipped
Level 1 system driven in a substantively similar environment with all other
aspects being equal, the presumption should be that this issue is due to
Level 2 defects, and not due to excessive frequency of driver error. Any
other interpretation forces the human driver into the role of a moral
crumple zone. 269
From a regulatory point of view, there should be a requirement for all
SAE Level 2 production vehicles to have an effective DMS as well as ODD
enforcement to mitigate foreseeable misuse to acceptable levels.
Additionally, reactive regulatory measures such as recalls should be
initiated for patterns of insufficient performance of DMS and ODD
enforcement related to elevated occurrence rates of specific types of
crashes. 270
3. Test platform regulation involving safety drivers
Having defined the scope of a production Level 2 vehicle in terms of
safety and the role of the driver, we turn our attention to the implications
for testing platforms.
A testing platform for Level 2 and above automation is one that provides
for automated control of speed plus steering, requires a human driver for

268. Patricia L. Hardre, When, How, and Why Do We Trust Technology Too Much?, in
EMOTIONS, TECHNOLOGY, AND BEHAVIORS (2016), at 85 (noting that "[t]echnology
overtrust is an error of staggering proportion, the direct and residual effects of which
have become apparent locally, nationally, and internationally").
269. See Elish, supra note 127 (describing how responsibility for an action may be
misattributed to a human actor who had limited control over the behavior of an
automated or autonomous system).
270. The NHTSA investigation into the relationship between the use of Tesla Auto Pilot
and crashes into emergency vehicles provides one example. See NTSB Response, supra

note 255, at 7-8.
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safety, and does not meet the requirements for a production Level 2 vehicle
defined in the preceding section. An ordinary licensed driver with no
specialized driving skills cannot reasonably be expected to operate such a
vehicle with acceptable safety. 271
Hallmarks of a testing platform include, but are not limited to:
"

Potential for software defects that cause sudden, dangerous
vehicle motion such as crossing the centerline into opposing
traffic, crashing into vehicles in adjacent lanes, or turning into
opposing traffic lanes. While a safety driver might be able to
mitigate such risks much of the time, the need to intervene for
mitigation makes a feature that displays such behaviors a test
platform if trained safety drivers are being used (or, alternately, a
defective deployed feature for ordinary drivers).

"

Unavailability of DMS capabilities robust enough to ensure
acceptable driver attention to complete the OEDR and otherwise
mitigate risks not handled by automation.

"

Unavailability of automatic ODD enforcement sufficient to deter
reasonably foreseeable misuse without use of supplemental
procedures and operational oversight. In a test environment, such
misuse includes attempting to operate in ways that activate
known software defects 272 even if the operation would otherwise
be allowable for the ODD in the absence of the defect.

"

A need to provide test platform operators with specialized
training and enforce operational protocols (such as limited length
driving shifts) so that they can remain attentive and react both

271. Acceptable safety is used as a positive term for absence of unreasonable risk. One
example criterion for acceptable safety might be having mishap rates at least as low as for
production vehicles in comparable driving circumstances and with comparable non-AV
safety features.
272. An example of activating a known software defect would be driving on two-way
traffic roads after a report of a test vehicle attempting to cross the centerline in a way that
presented risk of collision with potential oncoming traffic. A responsible testing
approach would be to either ground the test fleet or avoid such roads until a fix for the
dangerous behavior can be developed, validated, and deployed. Continuing to test in a
way that risks triggering known dangerous defects in a public road setting is a sign of a
defective organizational safety culture. For test platforms managing such risks is done in
the framework of a safety management system (SMS) specific to the testing operation.
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quickly and correctly to potentially dangerous automation
behaviors. 273
By construction, this definition specifically excludes some types of
vehicles that might part of an AV development effort that nonetheless are
as well behaved as production vehicles. Examples include manually driven
data gathering platforms and "shadow mode" test platforms that do not
permit non-production automation features to control vehicle motion.
In short, a test platform not only requires a human driver to oversee
operation, but also holds that human driver accountable for compensating
for one or more potential platform safety defects, self-ensuring acceptable
ability to intervene, and avoiding indulgence in misuse. This is likely to be
consistently achieved only via the use of specially trained test drivers and
protocols.
In practice, safe public road operation of test platforms requires the use
of specialized operator selection, operator training, and operational
protocols. This is the scope of SAE J3018.
The SAE J3018 standard 274 provides guidance for fallback test drivers
(colloquially called "safety drivers") for highly automated vehicle test
operators. The scope includes classroom instruction, training, workload
management, test planning, operational safety, driver monitoring, and
incident response management. The general goal of conforming to J3018 is
to ensure that public road testing is performed in a safe and responsible
manner. A primary source of content in J3018:2020 is the Automated
Vehicle Safety Consortium (AVSC) best practice on public road-testing
safety. 275
Additionally, a safety management system (SMS) is required to ensure
acceptably safe operations. An SMS is a "formal, top-down, organization-

273. The need for such training is not problematic for a test vehicle, but rather is essential.
The point here is that if drivers need special training that is a strong indication that the
vehicle is a test platform.

274. J3018, supra note 28.
275. AUTOMATED VEHICLE SAFETY CONSORTIUM [AVSC], AVSC BEST PRACTICE FOR INVEHICLE FALLBACK TEST DRIVER SELECTION, TRAINING, AND OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES FOR

AUTOMATED VEHICLES UNDER TEST, AVSC00001201911 (Nov. 8, 2019),

https://www.sae.org/standards/content/avscOO00120191 1/.
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wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of
safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and
policies for the management of safety risk." 2 7 6 The use of an SMS ensures
that testing is done in a responsible manner. Further, it allows the quick and
effective use of field feedback information to mitigate risks caused by
unexpected adverse events that occur during testing. A set of guidelines
published by the AVSC industry group is a reasonable starting point for a
public road-testing SMS, covering safety policy and objectives (SPO), safety
risk management (SRM), safety assurance (SA), and safety promotion
(SP).277

Regulators should regulate test platforms by requiring conformance to
SAE J3018 and the AVSC Testing Best Practice (pending potential future
evolution of that document to an SAE consensus standard document).
Additionally, regulators should consider guidance from the American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) regarding
licensing and other administrative matters related to testing.278
D. An Alternative to SAE 13016
Backing a definition of testing versus production for high level
automation is difficult in large part because J3016 is the wrong tool for the
job. Regulators should rightfully be concerned primarily with the safety of
their constituents, and J3016 is not (and does not purport to be) a safety
standard. Moreover, use of J3016 encourages gamesmanship in the form
exploiting the Level 2 Loophole (calling a Level 4 test platform Level 2) to
evade regulation. Fixing J3016 to be suitable for regulatory purposes would
be a complex and lengthy task. Fortunately, there is a simpler way.

276. Safety Management System (SMS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., (quoting FAA Order

8000.369), https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
277. AVSC, AVSC INFORMATION REPORT FOR ADAPTING A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(SMS) FOR AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM (ADS) SAE LEVEL 4 AND 5 TESTING AND

EVALUATION, AVSC0007202107 (July 2021), https://avsc.sae-itc.org/principle-7-5896VG465590G.html.
278. AM. ASS'N MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN., SAFE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF VEHICLES

Sept. 2020),
https://www.aamva.org/getmedia/66190412-ce9d-4a3d-8b6e-28cb8e3c10/Safe-Testingand-Deployment-of-Vehicles-Equipped-with-ADS-Guidelines_Final.pdf
EQUIPPED WITH AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS GUIDELINES (2nd ed.,
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We suggest that, for regulatory purposes, a highly automated vehicle be
defined as any vehicle in which a computer exerts steering control that is
intended to execute turns at intersections. 2 79 Such capabilities bring
dramatically increased risk of collisions and require significantly higher
levels of technological sophistication than lane following (and perhaps lane
changing) more typical of highway cruising.
This results in four vehicle types for regulatory purposes:
1. Non-automated vehicles (at SAE Levels 0 and 1), which are
regulated as conventional vehicles. 28 0
2. Low automation vehicles (a specific subset of SAE Level 2 vehicles).
These are production vehicles meeting the criteria identified for Level
2 vehicles above that are not capable of making turns at intersections.
This is a subset of vehicles currently designated SAE Level 2 by
manufacturers but is representative of Level 2 vehicles on the market
that have a stated ODD of roads without intersections. In essence,
these are "super-smart" cruise control systems that can do both speed
keeping and lane keeping in highway traffic safely. An ordinary
driver operates the system and is responsible for completing the
OEDR by detecting and responding to out-of-ODD situations. Both
effective DMS and ODD enforcement are required. Non-omissive
OEDR failures are considered evidence of a vehicle design defect.
Elevated mishap rates compared to non-automated vehicleswhether attributed to driver error or not-are prima facie evidence of
a vehicle design defect, with the vehicle design required to
accommodate expected cognitive and performance limitations of
ordinary drivers, supported by DMS and ODD limitation
enforcement.
3. Highly automated vehicles (production versions of SAE Level 3, 4, 5
vehicles that are designed for acceptable safety). These are

279. Lane changes might be permitted as an extension of lane-keeping, as might pulling
to the side of a road. The criteria presented here might be extended by considering any
capability that must handle designated road user crossings (vehicular intersections,
marked pedestrian crossings, non-signalized rail crossings, and bikeway crossings) also
be considered a highly automated vehicle.
280. Vehicles that might be considered in testing that do not automate both steering and
speed are still considered non-automated vehicles rather than test platforms for this

categorization.
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production vehicles for which the vehicle's own human driver cannot
be blamed for a crash during or adjacent to automated operation.281
Such vehicles should be required to conform to, as a minimum, ISO
26262, ISO 21448, and ANSI/UL 4600.282
4.

Automation test platforms. These are vehicles for which safety is
assured by the actions of a test driver beyond the scope expected for
a production low automation vehicle. This includes a requirement for
skills beyond those that can be reasonably expected from a civilian
driver demographic and corresponds to the hallmarks identified
previously for test platforms. Safe operation of automation test
platforms might require special licensing, but regardless require
special driver selection, driver training, operational protocols, and
use of an SMS. Operation of such vehicles should be required to
conform to SAE J3018 and the AVSC SMS guidelines.

Non-automated vehicles do not have vehicle automation capable of
sustained control of the steering wheel. Other automation categories are
distinguished by the role of the driver: ordinary driver (low automation),
no driver responsible for safety during automated driving (highly
automated vehicles), and a specially trained test driver conforming to
special policies and procedures (automated test platforms).
CONCLUSIONS

Based on our analysis, the AV industry is failing to pursue an optimal
strategy to create public trust-despite the industry correctly identifying
the importance of building trust to the long-term success of AV
technology. 28 3 Industry attempts to engender trust via education and

281. While beyond the scope of this article, a reasonable amount of transition time must
be afforded a human driver to take control after exiting automated operation regardless
of the cause of the transition. This exceeds the requirements of SAE Level 3, which
requires only "several seconds," J3016:2021, supra note 27, § 3.12 n. 3, which is an
unreasonably short takeover time limit to impose on human drivers if a safe outcome is
desired.
282. The NHTSA DEC. 3, 2020 ANPRM, supra note 136, seems an excellent starting point
for such regulations, although there are no doubt many more issues to be solved.
283. Building trust is important because the public is wary of AV technology. See, e.g.,
Megan Brenan, Driverless Cars Are a Tough Sell to Americans, GALLUP (May 15, 2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/234416/driverless-cars-tough-sell-americans.aspx. The IEEE
has predicted that the largest barrier to widespread adoption of AVs may have nothing
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indoctrination are hampered by untrustworthy actions and attitudes. The
public will not long embrace a complicated product-which can cause
serious injury and death when vehicle crashes and other mishaps inevitably
occur-if the public distrusts both the product and the people who make
it.284 We believe the shortcomings in the approach the industry uses to
develop trust stem from an adversarial posture towards law, regulation,
and disclosure. 28 5
To build a durable form of trust needed for long term AV industry
success, AV industry participants should shift to cooperation with
lawmakers and regulators by embracing appropriate engineering
standards specifically relating to safety, such as SAE J3018, and to embrace
ethical principles which promote trust, such as identified in IEEE 7000, to
foster ethical design for AV technology. To create greater certainty over the
scope of laws and regulations, legislatures, regulators, and the AV industry

to do with technology but will be acceptance by the public. See Doug Newcomb, You

Won't Need a Driver's License by 2040, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:42 PM),
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/09/ieee-autonomous-2040/.
284. The risk for a new technology, in the absence of trust, is that the public
"'exaggerate[s] the harms associated with an innovation' and demand[s] significantly
more severe laws than are warranted." See Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast & Furious: The

Misregulationof Driverless Cars, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 68 (2017) (quoting Kyle
Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of
Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1256 (2012)).
285. To be sure, one can point to apparent moments of cooperation between NHTSA and
industry, but they represent an exception rather than the rule (often committing industry
to take an action which industry already was inclined to take). See, e.g., Press Release,
NHTSA, NHTSA Announces Update to Historic AEB Commitment by 20 Automakers
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-announces-update-historicaeb-commitment-20-automakers. The current disagreement between Cruise and the city
of San Francisco, however, provides an example of the adversarial approach. Compare

Paresh Dave, San FranciscoAgency Opposes Cruise Robotaxi Application, Citing Safety,
REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2021, 4:03 PM)), https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-

transportation/san-francisco-agency-opposes-cruise-robotaxi-application-citing-safety2021-12-01/ (describing San Francisco's safety concerns), with Letter from Aichi N. Daniel,

Att'y, Cruise LLC, to Pub. Utils. Comm'n State California (Dec. 6, 2021)),
https://www.cpuc. ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/consumer-protection-andenforcement-division/documents/tlab/av-programs/phase-i-av-deployment-program-alstatus/20211206-cruise-llcs-reply-to-protest-and-comments-to-application-for-driverlessdeployment-permit.pdf (disputing San Francisco's concerns rather than working
cooperatively to address them).
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ought to abandon use of the SAE J3016 levels in statutes and regulations.28 6
One way to accomplish this cooperation would be for NHTSA and the AV
industry to engage in "negotiated rulemaking," a procedure that NHTSA
indicated in a 2020 report might be a productive way forward. 2 7 It would
not be the first time that NHTSA has used this procedure, though the
NHTSA 2020 Report describes negotiated rulemaking as "new." 288
The regulatory posture toward automotive technology in general has
historically been lax compared to other life critical technologies (such as air
and rail travel), featuring a manufacturer self-certification strategy. There
has been no substantive regulation relating to the performance of software
in life critical situations (such as a requirement for functional safety), and
no regulatory requirement to follow the foundational automotive software
safety standard (ISO 26262)289 that is, at this point, more than a decade old.
The AV industry seeks to maintain-if not further weaken-this inherited
lack of proactive safety regulation for computer-based automotive
functionality.
We attribute the adversarial posture of the AV industry towards law
and regulation to a longing for the legal environment that existed during
the development of railroads in the United States. The development of the
railroads introduced a disruptive technology into the United States which
transformed economic life for the better for many, while causing harm to
others. The AV industry and its many investors and supporters see AV
technology as similarly transformative. AV technology also will be
disruptive, whether the industry generally acknowledges its disruption or

286. See supra Part V.

287. See NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING, supra note 29; see also NHTSA 2020 REPORT, supra note
29.
288. Compare Vehicles Built in Two or More Stages, 69 Fed. Reg. 36038, 36040 (proposed
June 28, 2004) (suggesting use of negotiated rulemaking), with NHTSA 2020 REPORT,
supra note 29, Part IV.

-

289. See ISO 26262, supra note 145 (updating ISO, ISO 26262-1:2011 Road vehicles
Functionalsafety (2011)), described in Juergen Schloeffel & Joe Dailey, ISO 26262 - The
Second Edition:What's in It... and What Isn't, TECH DESIGN F. (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.techdesignforums.com/practice/technique/iso-26262-the-second-editionwhats-in-it-and-what-isnt/ (describing what to expect from the 2nd edition).
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not.290 Consider the taxicab business in New York City to glimpse the
disruptive potential for the evolving rideshare industry.
Some might misunderstand our critique as reflecting a Luddite dislike
for AV technology. But that is not so. Despite AV technology's potential for
disruption, we too see great promise and potential benefits for both safety
and more accessible mobility. 291 But we also see the AV industry as its own
worst enemy when it comes to managing the balance between safety and
trust.

A. Comparison to the Railroad Industry
The political and social dynamics of the present day differ dramatically
from the conditions at the time of the emergence of railroad technology.
Then, as now, the default posture of the law was that any action not
prohibited is permitted. But the public tolerance for risk and expectations
of government at that time no longer prevail today. Recall that the early
railroads operated without effective brakes 292 -placing the obligation on
the public to pay attention and "get out of the way" when a train
approached. 2 3 People of the time were more accustomed to calamity and
exhibited more self-reliance so the attempt to place the blame for accidents
on the victims had some surface appeal.
Our judgement is that citizens of today expect some combination of
the federal, state, and local governments to proactively engage in risk
avoidance and minimization of hazards, and to compel the industry to
perform responsible risk mitigation rather than pure profit maximization.
A key element of risk mitigation in all industries that use computers in a

290. Aurora notes the disruptive potential as a risk factor. See Aurora S-1, supra note 1, at
2-3. See generally Neal K. Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685

(2014).
291. Indeed, one of the authors got his start on self-driving safety in the 1990's as part of
the Federal Highways Automated Highway System (AHS) project. That multi-company,
multi-university project included a demo event on a closed public highway-preceding
the more famous DARPA challenges by many years.
292. George Westinghouse invented the air brake to remedy this shortcoming. See
HOLBROOK, infra note 308, at 290.
293. See WOLMAR, infra note 305, at 191. The early railroads also characterized those
injured or killed on the tracks as trespassers or vagrants. In fact, hundreds of children
were killed annually while playing on tracks.
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safety critical way, including rai1294 -but not yet automotive-is a
requirement to follow their own industry safety standards.
In response to railroad technology, the legal system developed common
law rules restricting the scope of tort liability. 295 Courts expressly
acknowledged that the logic of the rules facilitated the development of the
railroads and prevented the transfer of wealth from entrepreneurs to
individuals who suffered harm.2 6 Today, doctrines like "proximate cause"
no longer provide the same protection from liability as in times past.2 97
While still protective of business interests, the law provides more avenues
for recovery by aggrieved plaintiffs. But the mere threat of increased tort
liability does not appear sufficient to ensure proper attention to safety
standards needed to obtain and maintain trust.
We can learn two important lessons from the history of railroad
development and regulation that apply to the AV industry. Both relate to
the corporate management of public relations. 298

294. In one of the author's investigations on the rail industry, he has observed that rail
systems universally conform to international safety standards, typically IEC 50126, IEC
51028 and IEC 50129 for signals, safety equipment, and automated train controls.
295. "Everywhere after 1870, negligence was proclaimed to be the general rule of the
common law. In case law, the most powerful recognition of the triumph of the negligence
principle can be seen in two leading cases decided in 1872-1873 rejecting strict liability
principles laid down in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868)." MORTON J.
HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL

ORTHODOXY 13 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
296. "Under strict liability, enterprises, especially railroads, would be held liable for all
injuries regardless of fault. Many jurists, including Holmes, devoted themselves to
marginalizing this feared authority for redistribution in torts." Id.

297. See, e.g., Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) (protecting a railroad from
liability for a fire its equipment clearly caused by application of the "proximate cause"
doctrine).
298. Many commentators identify the railroad industry as the place where companies
first began to orchestrate public relations efforts in a serious and organized way. See, e.g.,
Nneka Logan, The Rise of the Railroad in Virginia:A HistoricalAnalysis of the Emergence of
Corporate Public Relations in the United States, 7 PUB. RELS. INQUIRY 5 (2018); Mark Aldrich,
Public Relations and Technology: The "Standard Railroad of the World" and the Crisis in
Railroad Safety, 1897-1916, 74 PA. HIST.: J. MID-ATLANTIC STUD. 74 (2007).
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First, in the case of the railroads, the public felt abused by monopoly
pricing of freight terms. 299 (The public also eventually became concerned by
the abysmal safety record for railway workers, with concerns over
passenger safety a distant third.) The railroad robber barons let pricing get
out-of-hand and, though it took time, effective national regulation
eventually followed with the formation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).300
The regulatory pendulum then swung the other way, with the ICC
approving almost no rate increases despite a desperate need to upgrade
infrastructure. 301 Moreover, the ICC's jurisdiction was expanded from rate
setting to safety regulations (such as a proposal to require the ratchet wheel
on hand brakes to have no fewer than 14 teeth). 302 The ICC (together with
reformers and the trade press) proposed use of block signals and steel
passenger cars, even suggesting control over railroad operating practices. 303
Though not every proposal found its way into legislation, the result was a
rail system in decline, as we see today.
The lack of public trust in the railroads due to high freight rates created
fertile conditions for the creation and expansion of this harsh regulatory
scheme. In a state of distrust over rate setting, when the rail industry
experienced a sharp increase in accidents (due, in part, to increased usage),

299. Popular dissatisfaction with freight pricing by railroads originated with the Grange
movement. See Lenny Frank, Farmer'sRebellion: A History of the Grange Movement, HIDDEN

HISTORY (Feb. 8, 2017), https://lflank.wordpress.com/2017/02/08/farmers-rebellion-ahistory-of-the-grange-movement/. See also WOLMAR, infra note 305, at 205.
300. HOLBROOK, infra note 308, at 295.
301. For example, in 1917 railroads appealed to the ICC for a 15-percent rate increase to
help offset rising costs associated with wartime traffic and raise revenue to invest back
into network enhancements-a request the ICC rejected. The railroad industry was not
deregulated until the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. This act was intended to address the
concern that if the rail industry could not substantially increase its rate of return it would
be nationalized. See Clifford Winston, The Success of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, AEIBROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES (Oct. 2005) (noting that rail's

regulated rate structure contributed to the industry's decline), at 2.

302. Aldrich, supra note 298, at 80-82.
303. Aldrich, supra note 298, at 82-83 (noting ICC's request to take over railroad

operating practices).
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the "result was an avalanche of proposals for what the carriers viewed as
intrusive and expensive safety regulations."3 04
This illustrates one downside of taking an adversarial approach to
regulation (in the railroad case, taken in the blind pursuit of profits) and
continuing an adversarial approach to safety measures in the face of
mounting accidents. Most would agree that neither the rail industry nor the
public benefitted from this regulatory scheme. The AV industry would do
well to avoid conditions that might lead to a similar destructive
overregulation backlash for autonomous driving systems. One proactive
measure would be to support legislation which made it mandatory for an
AV company to follow its own industry standards, perhaps those agreed
via a negotiated rulemaking process.
Second, though it took a while for the public to become concerned with
passenger safety in rail travel, the motivation for safety improvements
followed certain high-profile accidents before the Civil War. 305 The
intervention of the Civil War temporarily diverted public attention away
from train accidents. But public focus again turned to railroad safety
"fueled by a series of yet more eminently preventable accidents." 0 6

304. See Aldrich, supra note 298, at 81. Congress passed the Accident Reports Act in 1901,
followed in 1907 by mandated hours limitations for train workers and railroad
telegraphers, and required locomotive ashpans that could be cleaned without the need
for a person to go underneath a train (passed in the face of significant carrier opposition).

Id. at 77, 81.
305. In early 1853, the eight-year-old son of President-elect Franklin Pierce died in a rail
accident. CHRISTIAN WOLMAR, THE GREAT RAILROAD REVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF TRAINS

IN AMERICA (2012), at 193. Later at Grand Crossing in Chicago, on April 25, a train failed
to observe a stop signal, causing the death of 21 immigrant German passengers. Id. at
194. Less than two weeks later, on May 6, an engineer ignored a stop signal at a
drawbridge, and the train plunged into the Norwalk River in Connecticut resulting in 46
deaths. Id. These incidents were in addition to an increasing number of head-on train
collisions termed "cornfield meets." Id. The world's worst railroad accident to date took
place in 1856 at Camp Hill on the North Pennsylvania Railroad when 56 fatalities took
place in the "Picnic Train" disaster which involved a Sunday excursion train. Id. at 195.
The two-train collision also injured 100 people. "At root the problem was that the rapid
spread of the railroads had not been matched by the technological changes required to
keep them safe." Id. at 196. Accidents of this magnitude might occur in an AV application
used to platoon trucks.

306. Id. at 196.

259

2022

UCLA J.L. & TECH.

Vol. 27:3

Nevertheless, the railroad industry obstructed deployment of safety
devices, seeing accidents as "an unfortunate but unavoidable side effect of
an industry in which large machines moved at high speed." 307
Indeed, the automatic coupler and air brake gained universal adoption
because of a concerted effort led by Lorenzo Coffin, whose incessant
badgering of lawmakers to make the Westinghouse air brake and the
Janney coupler mandatory led to the Railroad Safety Appliance Act, which
became fully operative by 1900.308 Even then, the railroads objected because,
they argued, it was a mistake to mandate the use of a particular technology
(a common argument across industries to avoid regulation). 309
The public accurately perceived that the railroads had not embraced
safety measures. This likely contributed to a further decline in the
reputation of the railroad industry, damaging an image already tarnished
by perceived rate gouging. Our interpretation is that the laudable public
relations efforts which started in Pennsylvania after 1900 proved
insufficient to rehabilitate reputations once lost.31 0 This left the railroads too
weak effectively to challenge or reverse the stringent rate regulation that
contributed to the decline of that industry. The AV industry may find itself
in a similar position if it fails to follow its own industry safety standards
pursuant to an effective legislative mandate.

307. Id.
308. STEWART H. HOLBROOK, THE STORY OF AMERICAN RAILROADS 291, 295, 297 (1947).

309. WOLMAR, supra note 305, at 200.
310. The Pennsylvania Railroad led the way by featuring safety in its promotional
literature. In 1906, the Pennsylvania Railroad hired Ivy Lee as a response to the major
safety crisis that affected the railroads. "Lee's most important contribution was to stress
the need for candor on safety matters." Aldrich, supra note 298, at 84. The passenger
fatality rates had increased to 24 per billion miles traveled. (By comparison, American
commercial air travel in the 1990's had a fatality rate of .27 fatalities per billion miles
traveled. Aldrich at 78.) In "Slaughter on Railroads", the Chicago Daily News asserted that
passengers and trainmen were being butchered day by day because railroads found it
cheaper to kill than not to kill. Aldrich at 79. At Lee's urging, the Pennsylvania Railroad
made the results of its crash investigations public. Aldrich at 84. The AV industry has the
time to take proactive steps to avoid these types of headlines and all the harm that might
follow by simply truly embracing a safety culture and a commitment to following
industry standards.
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B. Recommendations to the AV Industry
Currently, the AV industry is unquestionably anti-regulation. This risks
further degradation of trust every time there is a high-profile adverse media
event. 311 An industry strategy of painting whichever company is implicated
in the fatality as a bad, rogue actor will only hold up for so long. The
industry is taking a large gamble that it will be able to deploy AVs in a
convincingly positive light before an increasing number of adverse
events- and the consequent public outcry-forces regulators' hands. As
the promised deployment timeline for AV technology drags on year after
year (while the industry currently has plans for near term deployment of
AVs at scale), this seems an increasingly risky strategy.
But whatever may come, we are confident that the AV industry would
do well to embrace the reality of a safety culture rather than merely
propound the illusion of safety in a technological Potemkin village. We fear
that the latter approach, while potentially expedient in the short term, will
prove unwise in the long term. It is in that spirit that we offer up our
observations about the importance of trust and suggest one approach to
build lasting trust by truly embracing a culture of safety-starting by
embracing safety standards drafted by the AV industry itself and tailored
in a cooperative negotiated rulemaking process to meet the needs of
industry, regulators, and the public.

311. In this article, we make a case for regulation of AV technology by focusing on how
the AV industry might lose trust based on actions industry participants take (or do not
take) such as: failing to comply with law or published industry standards, failing to
disclose deployment standards, and perpetrating myths which conceal capabilities and
manipulating democratic processes. Trust in Al, however, requires more than taking the
actions we suggest. Further ethical questions remain about the specific capabilities of Al
systems and their use relating to privacy, the potential for automated data usage to
discriminate against protected classes, and the status of an Al system (or "robot") as a
moral agent. See, e.g., Benjamin Kuipers, Perspectives on Ethics of Al: Computer Science, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF Al 421 (Markus Dubber, Frank Pasquale, & Sunit Das
eds., Oxford U. Press, 2020) (noting how an AV as a moral agent must do more than
choose the lesser evil when confronted by an ethical dilemma -such as a choice of which
pedestrian to hit in an unavoidable collision-but instead recognize upstream decision
points that avoid the dilemma entirely).
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